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MORRIS el al. v. POWELL.
When the Constitution defines how a right may be exercised, it prohibits the exercise of that right in some other way.
Registration laws must be uniform, impartial and reasonable.
Therefore, a statute requiring those voters who have been absent from
the State six months or more, or who have gone into another State with
the intention of voting therein, to register, ninety days before the election, a notice of their intention to become qualified electors with the clerk
of a court, when the Constitution only requires sixty days' residence in
the county; or, if an elector is absent from the State for six months on
business of the State or the United States, requiring him to produce a
certificate from the county auditor to the effect that his name has continuously, since his departure, been on the tax duplicate, and that he is still a
tax-payer, is unconstitutional. MITCHIr, L, J., dissenting in part.
Although the Constitution of a State provides that the Legislature shall
enact a registration law, yet the failure of the Legislature to enact suck
a law does not deprive an elector of his right to vote at an election.
The Legislature cannot require an elector to possess qualifications not
required by the Constitution, when that instrument has prescribed his
qualifications.
It cannot require a property qualification, nor a longer residence than
that required by the Constitution.
When the Constitution defines the qualifications of voters, those qualifications cannot be added to or changed by legislative, enactment.
When the Constitution defines the qualifications of an elector, and
provides that if he possesses these qualifications, "and has been duly
registered according to law," he shall be entitled to vote, registration
is as muck a qualification as either age or residence.
One elector, or one class of electors, cannot be required to register,
while another has the right to vote without registering.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Henry County.
Clias. S. Hernly for appellant.
3f. E. Forkuer and A. C. H-arris for appellee.
OLDS, J., October 8, i890. This action was brought by
Simon T. Powell against Joshua I. Morris, Auditor of Henry
County, and William H. Elliott, to enjoin the payment of
an account for books furnished the County for registering
voters, under section thirteen of the election law of :1889,
(Acts of 1889,, page 163; Elliott's Supp. § 1335,) and it
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involves the validity of said section. A demurrer was filed
by the appellant to the complaint and overruled, and, he refusing to plead further, judgment was rendered on demurrer
in favor of appellee. The section of the law reads as
follows:
SEc. 13. Each elector shall vote by ballot in the precinct wherein he
resides. Any person who, having been a resident of Indiana, shall have
absented himself from the State for a period of six months or more, or who
shall have gone into any other State or sovereignty with the intention of
voting therein, or during any absence in any other State or sovereignty
shall have voted therein ; and also any person who shall not have been a
honza fide resident of this State and of the county in which he resides at
least six months before any election, shall, before being entitled to vote
at any election in this State, register a notice of his intention to become a
qualified elector therein, in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of
the county in which he resides. Whoever shall be absent from the state
for a period of six months or more on business of the State, or .of the
United States, shall, at the time he offers to vote, produce a certificate
from the county auditor that his name has continuously, since his depart-,
ure from the State on such business, been upon the tax duplicate of said
county for the purpose of taxation during his absence from the State,
and that -he is still a tax-payer in said county; and, failing to produce
such certificate, such person shall not be permitted to vote, Such registration shall be made at least three months prior to any such election, and
the notice shall state such person's name, age, and place of residence
(by which shall be understood his lodging-place), and the notice shall be
in the form following, andsworn to before such clerk:
State of Indiana, s
County
J
I,
-,
the subscriber hereto, hereby declare my intention to become a qualified elector under the laws of Indiana; that I was years
of age on my last birthday; that my. lodging-place is now (here
insert exact location), and I am a bonafide resident of the precinct in
-which I lodge.
Pi-ovided,That the provisions of this section respecting such registration and notice shall not apply to any voter who, six months or more previous to any election, shall have registered with said clerk a notice deolaring his intention to hold his residence in this State during a contemplated absence, and that during such absence lie will not exercise the
right of suffrage elsewhere, and which notice shall be as follows, and shall
be sworn to before said clerk:

}

State of Indiana,
.
County, I
I, , the subscriber hereto, a qualified voter of
(here insert
the name of his precinct, ward, township, town, and city), in said
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county, intending to absent myself, do hereby declare my purpose to hold
my residence as a voter in said State, and that I will not exercise the right
of suffrage elsewhere during my absence.
On the filing of any notice, as provided for in this section, it shall be
the duty of such clerk to enter the name and residence of said elector,
and date of the filing of said notice, in a book furnished for said purpose,
to be open at all times to the inspection of the public, and safely preserve
said original notice, and deliver a certified copy of the same to the elector
so registering; and, on demand of any challenger or member of the election board, such elector shall be requested to produce the same before
being allowed to vote. No person shall register for any other person, or in
the name of any other person, or present the copy of the register for any other person at a polling place, or induce, hire, or advise any other
person not to register, who may be required to register as above.
Any person violating the provisions of this section, or who shall vote or
attempt to vote without having been registered when required to do so
as above, shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction, shall be imprisoned in the State prison for not less than one nor more than five years,
aifd bq disfranchised for any determinate period. No elector shall be at
any cost or charge for such registration or certificate thereof, and the clerk
shall be allowed twenty-five cents, and no more, for each registration and
certificate thereof, to be in full for all services connected therewith, which
allowance shall be made out of the county treasury by the board of county
commissioners, on itemized statements sworn to by said clerk.

Article two, section one, of the Constitution of this State,
declares that "all elections shall be free and equal;" and
section two of the same article defines in unambiguous language who shall be entitled to vote.
SEc. 2. In all elections not otherwise provided for by this Constitution, every male citizen of the United States, of the age of twenty-one
years, and upward, who shall have resided in the State during six months,
and in the township sixty days, and in the ward or precinct thirty days,
immediately preceding such election; and every male of foreign birth, of
the age of twenty-one years, and upward, who shall have resided in the
United States one year, and shall have resided in this State during the six
months, and in the township sixty days, and in the ward or precinct
thirty days, immediately preceding such election, and shall have declared
his intention to become a citizen of the United States, conformably to
the laws of the United States on the subject of naturalization, shall be entitled to vote in the township or precinct where he may reside, if he shall
have been duly registered according to law.

Section four of the same article provides that "no person shall be deemed to have lost his residence in the State
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by reason of his absence, either on business of this State or
of the United States."
Under the Constitution a person must have certain qualifications to entitle him to vote, viz. : He must be a male citizen of the United States ; or, if of foreign birth, must have
declared his intention to -become a citizen of the United
States conformably to the laws of the United States on the
subject of naturalization,.and have resided in the United
States one year. He must be twenty-one years of age, and
have resided in the State six months, and in the township
sixty days, and in the precinct thirty days, and he must be
duly registered according to law providing for the registration of voters. If a ]person possess all these qualifications he is entitled to vote; but if there be any one of
these qualifications which-he does not possess, then he is not
entitled to vote, except if there be no legally enacted statute
providing for the registration of voters, then he is. exempt
from the duty of registering ; or, rather, the voters of the
State cannot be disfranchised by reason of the failure of
the Legislature to comply with a constitutional mandate.
In 1881, the electors of the State, by a majority of over
eighty-seven thousand, amended section fourteen of article
two of the Constitution so as to provide that. the "General
Assembly shall provide for the registration of all voters
entitled to vote," and it is by reason of an omission or a
refusal on the part of the General Assembly to obey and
comply with this constitutional mandate that the voters of
the State have exercised the right of suffrage without registration since the adoption of this Amendment. That the
General Assembly has the power to enact a law providing
for a uniform system of registration of all voters, we think
cannot be controverted, and that it is made the duty of the
General Assembly, by the Constitution, to enact a law providing a reasonable, uniform, and impartial system for the
registration of all voters must be conceded; but section
thirteen of the present law imposes certain duties upon a
certain class of voters, and requires- certain qualifications of
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ether classes, while a much larger portion is not included
within its provisions or affected thereby.
The question is presented as to whether or not the Legislature can impose the obligations which it seeks to do by
this section, on the class of voters therein specified, and to
another class add a qualification not required by the Constitution to entitle them to vote. This section attempts.to impose an obligation upon all persons who, being residents of
the State of Indiana, shall absent themselves from the State
for a period of six months or more, or who shall have gone
into any other State or sovereignty with the intention of
voting therein, or who during an absence in any other
State or sovereignty have voted therein, and upon all
persons who shall not have been bona fide residents of
this State, and of the county in which they reside, at
least six months before any election, the duty of registering a notice of thir intention to become qualified electors
in their respective precincts in the office of the clerk of
the circuit court of the county in which they reside at least
three months prior to any such election, and makes it a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the State prison, to
vote, or attempt to vote, without having been so registered.
It is also attempted by this section to make the right to vote
of certain electors of this State, who shall be absent from
this State for a period of six months or more, on business
of the State or of the United States, to depend upon their
producing, at the time they offer to vote, a certificate of
the county auditor that their names have continuously, since
their departure from the State, been upon the tax duplicate
of said county, for the purpose of taxation, during their
absence from the State, and that they are still taxpayers in
said -county.
This latter clause seeks to add, in addition to the qualifications required by the Constitution, a property qualification
to a certain class of voters, for it provides that persons being
absent from the State on the business of the State or United
States shall be taxpayers in the county in which they reside, and that they shall keep their namnes on the tax dupli-
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cate during their absence, and shall furnish a certificate of
the auditor to that effect before they shall have a right to
vote. None of the names of voters except able-bodied men
between the ages of twenty-one and fifty years, and persons
owning taxable property in the county, properly appear
upon the tax duplicate, and [others] are not taxpayers in
the county ; so that a voter over fifty years of age, being absent on business of the State or United States, and owning
no taxable property in the county, is not a taxpayer in the
county, and he could not procure such a certificate from the
county auditor, and on voting; or attempting to vote, he
would, by this section, be guilty of a felony.
The only reasonable construction to be placed upon this
part of the section is that, in addition to the qualifications to
vote as required by the Cofistitution, it adds another-a property qualification-that he shall own taxable property, within
the county where he resides, and shall* keep his name upon
the tax duplicate. The Legislature has no such power.
That, when the people by the adoption of the Constitution,
have fixed and defined in the ,Constitution itself what qualifications a voter shall possess to entitle him to vote, the
Legislature cannot add an additional qualification, is too
plain and well recognized for argument, or to need the citation of authorities.
The principle is elementary that when the Constitution
defines the qualification of voters, that qualification cannot
be added to or changed by legislative enactment. That our
Constitution does define the qualification of voters, and that
the part of section thirteen, szulra, providing that certain
persons shall make proof of the fact that they are taxpayers
of the county, is an attempt to add an additional qualification, will admit of no doubt; and it is, therefore, unconstitutional and void. This is in accordance with the holding
of this Court in Quinn v. State (1871), 35 Ind. 485. The
Court, in this case, says:
In Rison v. Farr(1865), 25 Ark. 161, the Court held that where the
Constitution, as in that State, fixes the qualifications of and determines
.%who shall be deemed qualified voters, those qualifications cannot be added
to by the Legislature.
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In the case of Quinn v. State, it is held that a law providing for a residence of twenty days in the township, was in
conflict with the Constitution of this State then in force,
which did not require a residence for any definite length of
time in the township. St. Joseph, etc., R. Co. v. Buchanan
County Court (1867), 39 Mo. 485 ; Peofle v. Canaday'(1875),
73 N. C. 198; Page v. Allen (i868), 58 Pa. 338; State v.
Williams (1856), 5 Wis. 308; Zinneenr v. Vells (1887), 144
Mass. 497.
That portion of the section providing for certain persons
to register before being entitled to vote, was evidently intended, and we think it must be regarded, as an attempt to
create a system of registration, whereby persons coming
within its provisions shall be required to register before
being entitled to vote. It is true it can hardly be said it
creates a court or board with authority to detennine who
are legal voters and have the right to vote and enter their
names upon a register as legal voters. Yet it does provide
for a mode of registering and keeping a record of certain
classes of voters, and requires such voters to produce a certificate of such registration betore being entitled to vote, and
it may be properly regarded as attemlnting to create a system
for the registration of certain classes of voters. It is designated in the section as a registration.
Courts differ as to the effect of a law requiring the registration of voters in States wherein the Constitution defines
the qualifications of voters, and is silent upon the question
of registration; some courts holding registration .to be a
mere regulation as to the mode of exercising the right of
suffrage, while other courts, and we think the better
reasoned opinions, hold it to be adding a qualification. But,
whatever may be the true rule where the Constitution is
silent, we think there can be no doubt that, under the Constitution of this State, registration under a proper law constitutes a qualification. When the Legislature of this State
enacts a law providing for a reasonable, uniform, and impartial registration of all voters in this State, then registration
will constitute a qualification which the voter must possess
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to entitle him to vote, the same as any of the other qualifications defined by the Constitution. When such a registration law is enacted, the voter then must possess the qualification of being a male citizen of the United States, twentyone years of age, or 6ver, and must have resided in the State
six months, in the township sixty days, in the ward or precinct thirty days, and must be duly registered according to
law. If he possess all these qualifications, he can -vote; if
he jacks either, he cannot vote. The Constitution, in defining the qualification of voters, makes one of the qualifications to be:
If he shall have been duly registered according to law.

When a valid law for the registration of all voters shall
have been enacted as required by the Constitution, then
registration will be as much a qualification as age or residence. The qualifications of voters must be uniform. One
voter must possess the same as another, and he need possess
no more. Where, as under our Constitution, registration is
a qualification, one voter cannot be required by a law to
register while another has the right to vote without registering. Indeed, such a discrepancy would invalidate a law
even if the Constitution was silent as to registration.
Under the Constitution of this State a male citizen of the
United States over the age of twenty-one years, who has
been a resident of this State for six months prior to any
election, may, up to sixty days prior to such election, exercise the right to move and change his residence from county
to county, and from township t9 township, within the State,
as often as he may desire, but from that time forward he
must have a fixed residence in the county and township
where he intends to vote; but he may still continue to
change his residence from precinct to precinct up to thirty
days prior to the election, after which time he must have a
fixed residence in the precinct to be entitled to vote. The
Constitution grants to every voter the right of changing his
intention and residence from county to county, and township to township, up to sixty days before an election, and of
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still continuing to change, if he so desire, from precinct to
precinct up to thirty days before an election. Nothing is
required of the voter up to sixty days prior to the election,
except that he reside in the State. The Constitution does
not require of the voter that he fix oi designate his residence in any particular township up to sixty days prior to
an election. From that time forward he cannot change his
residence from one township to another if he desires to vote.
The same is true in regard to the precinct up to thirty days
before an election. The voter is left free to change his intention and residence up to these dates. These privileges
belong to, and are exercisable by, every qualified voter of
the State, whether he be temporarily absent from the State
for a day, a month, a year, or even longer, or not absent at
all.
A mere temporary absence does not, in any way, affect his
residence, or his right to vote, under the Constitution; but
section thirteen, szqfra, provides that persons who absent
themselves from the State for a period of six*months, and
persons who have not resided in one county for six months,
before any election, shall register, as provided by such section, ninety days before the election, to entitle them to vote,
and they are required to produce the certificate of registration before voting. While this section is indefinite in some
of its provisions, and its meaning and purpose somewhat
obscure, yet it seems to us that the reasonable construction
to be given to it, is that such voters shall declare their intention to become qualified voters, and fix and designate the respective precincts of which they are residents, and entitled
to vote, ninety days before an election, and that, upon presentation of theit certificates of registration, they shall have
the right to vote in the precinct so designated; and that it
requires of such voters that they designate their voting precinct ninety days prior to an election, and is, in fact, requiring a fixed residence in the precinct ninety days previous to
an election, and, in this particular, at least, it is an abridgment of the rights of such voters, and is in direct conflict
with the Constitution..
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It seems to us that the construction we have placed upon
this part of the section is the only reasonable construction it
will bear. It certainly was not the intention of the Legislature to require such voters to designate their particular
place of residence, even to their exact lodging-place, as required by the notice, in some voting precinct other than
that in which they would have a right to vote, or, in other
words, to require them t6 designate their particular lodgingplace in one precinct ninety days before an election, and yet
recognize the right of such voters to change their residence
sixty days after registering, and vote in another precinct, and
make the evidence of the registration proof of their right to
vote in a ward or precinct other than that designated in the
notice of registration. This section also provides that the
registration books shall be kept open at all times for the inspection of the public. Certainly the object of such registration, and the keeping of the books open to the inspection
of the public, is for the purpose of requiring such voters to
fix and designate their residence and voting places ninety
days before the election, and affording information to the
public as to the residence and lawfil voting places of such
persons. But if we are in error in this construction, the
provision is obnoxious to the Constitution, and void for
other reasons.
It is a well-settled rule of law that "when the Constitfttion defines the circumstances under which a right may be
exercised, or a penalty imposed, the specification is an implied prohibition against legislative interference, to add to
the condition, or to extend the penalty to other cases." This
language of Judge COOLEY is quoted with approval by the
Court in the case of Quinn v. State, sufira. See, also,
; and
Mechem, Pub. Off. § 148; State v. WfVilliamns, snra.
State v. Tuttle (188 1), 53 Wis. 45. In other words, when the
Constitution commands how a right may be exercised, it prohibits the exercise of that right in some other way: if exercised
at all it must be exercised as commanded by the Constitution.
The Constitution of this State, § 14, art 2, provides that
the "General Assembly * * * shall provide for the
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Tegitration of all persons entitled to vote."

This provision

-defines how the Legislature shall exercise the right 6f requiring the registration of voters; that is, by providing that all
voters shall register. This constitutional mandate is an implied prohibition against providing for the registration of
any class, or for only a part of the voters, and this is consistent with the great weight of authorities upon the question
-of the validity of registration laws, which hold that such
laws must be impartial, reasonable, and uniform. Judge
COOLEY states the law to be that "all regulations of the
elective franchise, however, must be reasonable, uniform and
impartial. They must not have for their purpose directly or
indirectly to deny or abridge the constitutional right of the
'citizen to vote or unnecessarily to impede its exercise. If
they do they must be declared void." Cooley, Const Lim.
(5th lEd.) 758. See, also, authorities hereinbefore cited.
In a well-reasoned opinion in the case of A'tornze' Gen,eralv. City of Detroit [decided in the Supreme Court, Michigan, Dec. 28, 1889], the authorities on the question are
fully reviewed and considered, and it is held by the Supreme
Court of Michigan in that case, that a registration law is
unreasonable and void if it provides for but five registration
.days during the year, at one of which the elector must make
-personal application for registration; that it thereby disfran.chises persons who are ill or absent on registration days, but
vho would be able to vote on electio i days. It also holds
the same act void because it is not impartial, in that it requires a naturalized voter to produce his certificate of
naturalization, or show, by evidence other than his own
oath, that such certificate was issued, while it permits a
native-born citizen to prove his right to vote by his own
oath. The Court in that case, after citing and reviewing
numerous authorities, says:
These authorities all tend in one direction. They hold that the Legislature has the right to reasonably regulate the right of suffrage, as to the
manner and time and place of voting, and to provide all necessary and
reasonable rules to establish and ascertain by proper proof the right to
-vote of any person offering his ballot, but has no power to restrain or
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abridge the right or unnecessarily to impede its free exercise. This law
before us disfranchises every person too ill to attend the board of registration, and unreasonably and unnecessarily requires persons whose business
duties, public or private, are outside of Detroit, to return home to register, as well as to vote, making two trips, when only one ought to be required.

See Daggett v. H d n (1885), 43 Ohio St. 548.
Indeed, section thirteen, supra, seems to be aimed at a
certain class of voters who may be absent from the State for
a period of six months, either for pleasure or on business of
a public or private character, and those at all times within
the State who may be compelled, in order to obtain employment or for other lawful purposes, to change their residence
from one county to another within the six months next preceding an election, and it imposes a burden upon them
which is not imposed upon other voters, and changes their
constitutional privileges and rights. It requires them to
designate their particular residence and voting precinct, and
prohibits them from again changing it, at a time when,
under the Constitution, they are not required to do so. It
imposes extra burdens and hardships on these classes of
voters. In this respect it is both unreasonable and not impartial. Under the Constitution, the rights of voters who
are required to move from one county to another within six
months and prior to sixty days before an election, in order
to obtain employment or for other lawful purposes, and
those who are compelled to be temporarily absent from the
State. for six months, or longer, to earn a living for themselves and families, or to recuperate their health, or for other
proper motives, are as sacred under the Constitution as those
whose circumstances are such as not to require them to
change their residence to seek employment, or to be absent
from the State for that or any other lawful purpose. The
Constitution guaranties the same rights to all voters who are
bonafide residents of the State.
If once admitted that the Legislature has the power to
enact a law requiring persons who are absent from the State
six months to register ninety days before an election, why
may not a law be valid requiring persons who are absent
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from the State three months or one month or one day also
to register? And if a law requiring a registration ninety
days before an election is valid, why not a law requiring a
registration six months, one year, or even a longer time before an election? If a law requiring all persons who are
absent from the State six months to register, and none
others, is valid, why would not a law requiring all foreignborn citizens, or all persons engaged in farming or manufacturing, and none others, to register, be valid? If this law
is valid which requires all persons to register who are residents of the State six months, but not residents of the
county six months, prior to an election, why may not the
Legislature enact a valid law requiring persons moving from
one ward to another at any time within six months, and
none others, to register? Indeed, it s ems to us to be beyond controversy that if the present act can be upheld,
aimed, as it is, at a class of traveling men, and men whom
business of a public or private character, or ill health, may
take from the State six months, and persons who may be required to move from one county to another to obtain employment within six months preceding an election, and imposing, as it does, a burden upon these classes of citizens
which is imposed upon none other, then the Legislature may
enact a valid law relating to any class, designating them by
nationality, place of birth, religious belief, professional or
business pursuits, and require them, and none others, to
register. If this law, which requires a registration of this
class of citizens ninety days before an election, is valid, then
any class of voters may be singled out and burdened, and
duties imposed upon them which are not imposed upon
others, and obstiucting their right of suffrage as given to
them by the Constitution of the State. It matters not
whether this provision of the law be termed a registration of
voters or a provision requiring certain proof of the class of
voters named to entitle them to vote. In either event the
effect is the same, for it requires proof of the qualifications
to vote, which the voter under the Constitution does not
have to possess, and the effect of the law is the same, and it
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changes and abridges the rights of the classes of voters
designated. We believe this section of the law to be in contravention of the Constitntion, in opposition to all authority,
and illegal and void.
As we have said, the Legislature has the right to pass a
law requiring a registration of all voters, and the Constitution expressly requires the passage of such a law. But
under the provisions of the Constitution, it must apply alike
to all voters. One class of voters cannot be required to possess qualifications which are not required of all others.
Under the Constitution, voters may change their residence
from precinct to precinct up to thirty days prior to an election. This right cannot be impaired or taken from them by
legislative enactment, and, until that time has occurred, they
cannot be required to' designate their intended residence, and
voting precinct, at a future election. Up to that date they
have the right to change their intention and place of residence as often as their circumstances may require, or as they
may choose. The right to so change their intention and
residence is given to every voter by the Constitution, and
cannot be abrogated or interfered with. The authorities
universally hold that registration laws must be impartial,
uniform, and reasonable, giving to all who have a right to
vote a fair and reasonable opportunity to exercise such right.
The Constitution not only confers up6n the General Assembly the power to make illegal voting an impossibility by a
proper system of registration, but it makes it the imperative
duty of that body to exercise that power. The imposition
of unauthorized burdens and qualifications not authorized
by the Constitution upon a part of the citizens of the State
is not an exercise of that power, and while we would regret
to declare void any law having for its object the purity of
the elections, we cannot so far forget our duty as to uphold
a law so plainly in conflict with the fundamental law of the
State as the section of the law under Consideration.
The provisions of the section we have particularly considered and discussed render the whole section void, and we
deem it unnecessary to further discuss the other portions of
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the section: State v. Denn), (1888), 118 Ind. 449; Baldwin
v. Franks (1887), i2o U. S. 678; Norton v. Shelby Co.
(1886), 118 U. S. 425. The conclusion we have reached
being in harmony with the holding of the Circuit Court, it
follows that the judgament must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
ELLIOT'r, J., (concurring.) The questions for decision,
-although they arise on a single section of a statute, are of
the greatest importance, inasmuch as they concern the highest right of citizenship; and it is, therefore, not improper
that separate opinions should be expressed. No other questions face us except such as arise upon section thirLeen of
the election law of 1889, and the decision of those questions
does not affect other provisions of the Act, nor can it do so,
for the section is an independent one, and its downfall carries
no other part of the Act. Nor do I deem it necessary for
-us to decide whether there are not some provisions of the
section which, if separated, and put in.proper form, might
-not be valid, for the entire section, with its provisions interlocked beyond the power of severance, is before us for judg-ment, and we can only give judgment upon the section as
it is written: Griffin v. State (1889), 11 Ind. 520; Baldwin v. Franks (I887), 12o U. S. 678.
It is proper to say, by way of introduction, that the question is what a Legislature may do, acting under a written
Constitution which gives it all the power resp ecting the
right of suffrage that it possesses, and not what may be done
by Congress or by a Territorial Legislature acting under a
law of Congress, nor what may be done by the people in
framing or amending a Constitution.
The thirteenth section of the act of 1889, construed as I
think it must be, requires one who has not resided for six
months iii the county where he claims the right to vote, to
register his intention to become a voter ninety days before
the election, thus requiring of the citizen two things, namely:
That in order to be entitled to register he shall have resided
.n the county six months; and that he shall register his in-
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tenton to become a voter ninety days before the election.
He is required by these provisions to reside in the county in
order to acquire the character of a voter a much longer
time than the Constitution requires, for it requires a residence of only sixty days. It is entirely safe to affirm that
no one will question the proposition that the Legislature has
no power to require a longer residence than that fixed by
the Constitution. The affirmation of this proposition leads,
beyond the possibility of cavil, to the conclusion that the
provisions referred to are utterly destitute of force. There
are, however, other objections to the validity of section thirteen which seem to me to be insurmountable, and these objections go to the entire section, as its provisions are so interwoven as to be incapable of severance, and are, to my mind,
so palpable that it is impossible to avoid perceiving them or
to escape their force.
It may not be improper to preface the direct statement and
discussion of these objections by affirming that it is not because the Legislature does not possess power to enact a general registry law that section thirteen is invalid, for no one
who studies the language of the Constitution, or heeds the
history of the amendments of 1881, can doubt that it was
the purpose of the people to invest the Legislature with
power to enact a general registry law. But, while this is
true, it is also true that no other conclusion will square with
the judgments of candid men than this: The Legislature
can enact only such a law concerning the right of suffrage as
the Constitution authorizes. This, therefore, is the central
question: Is the thirteenth section of the election law of
1889 such an enactment respecting the right of suffrage as
the Constitution authorizes? The question is one of power.
If the Constitution authorizes such enactments as those contained in section thirteen, the power exists, and the section
must stand; if the Constitution does not authorize such a
law, the power does not exist, and the section must fall.
With questions of policy or expediency the courts have
nothing to do, but it is their duty to determine whether
there is or is not power to enact such a law.
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The power which the General Assembly assumed to exercise, is not an ordinary legislative power, for, in assuming to
legislate upon the subject of the qualifications of voters, that
body entered into the domain of those in whom the original
power resides, and from whom all legislative powers are derived. The people control the subject of the right of suffrage, and legislative assemblies have only such power over
that subject as the people have granted them by the organic
law. That the Legislature cannot add to the qualifications
of voters is a proposition upon which there is no diversity
of opinion: Cooley, Const. Lim. 78. It would be strange,
indeed, if the Legislature could add qualifications to those
prescribed by the Constitution, for the right of suffrage is a
political right, and it is the right of a sovereign. The people are above the Legislature, and they are there because the
Legislature has no power to abridge or qualify the sovereign
right of suffrage.
Section thirteen violates the Constitution by assuming to
classify the voters of the State, and by adding qualifications
to those prescribed by the Constitution. It assumes to divide the voters into taxpayers and nontaxpayers, and to add
to the requirements of the Constitution, the requirement that
the citizen shall be recorded as a taxpayer. It violates the
Constitution, by assuming to classify voters into those who
remain continuously in the State, and those who temporarily
absent themselves from it. Where the Constitution makes a
classification, a different one cannot be made by the Legislature. Our Constitution does make a classification, for it
specifically provides wh6 shall be eligible to vote. Where
the Legislature exercises the power conferred upon it, and
enacts a registry law, then legislation is essential to qualification; but where there is no such law, registration cannot be
made essential, for in the absence of a registry faw the sole
qualifications of a voter are citizenship, age and residence.
The General Assembly has no power to enact a law operating through a classification exclusively its own. This is
indeed, a corollary of the proposition that it has no power to
classify voters except by following the Constitution. Under
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the Constitution, the Legislature has power to make two
classes, registered and unregistered, but it cannot create a
third class: Attorney Generalv. City of Detroit [decided in
the Supreme Court, Michigan, Dec. 28, 1889]. If the
power to classify exists in one-case it exists in all. No one
will deny that if the Legislature has power over a subject, it
is master of its own discretion, and may enact any law it
chooses. Grant the power, and the discretion is unlimited.
If the Legislature has power to make the classification attempted in section thirteen, then it may provide that only
-naturalized citizens shall register, or that farmers shall register, and no others, or that commercial travelers, temporarilyabsent in the line of their business, shall make affidavits, and
record their names, although such things may be required of
no othier citizen.- In short, if the power exists, the Legislature may make any classification it pleases. To my mind it
is perfectly clear that it can do no such thing. It cannot, in
any form, classify the fundamental political right of suffrage except as the Constitution expressly authorizes it to do.
Such a right is infinitely higher than legislative authority
can climb. No matter what form legislation may assume, it
*is utterly void if it touches upon. the right of suffrage in a
mode not authorized by the Constitution. The name given
the legislation adds nothing, for a name can no more change
its substance than a name can change the odor of a rose.
The provision of section thirteen assuming to impose
upon a citizen who has resided in the State for the period
prescribed by the Constitution, tae duty of making an affidavit declaratory of. his intention to become a voter, is in
violation of the Constitution; and so, too, is the provision
which assumes to require a citizen who has been temporarily
absent to swear that he has not voted elsewhere. A citizen
who does -hat the Constitution requires, cannot be required
to do more. If he fixes his character as a voter by a residence for the time designated by the Constitution, the incidents inseparably connected with that character are beyond
legislative touch. The principle here asserted has been dedared by our own, and by other courts. We must adhere
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to it or overrule our own decisions, and disregard those of
other states: Quinn v. State (187), 35 Ind. 485; Feibleman v. State (1884), 98 Ind. 516; Rion v. Farr (I865),
24 Ark. I61 ; Davies v. Jfc.eeby (1870), 5 Nev. 369.
It is no answer to many of the propositions I have affirmed, to assert that the classification attempted is valid because all who belong to a designated class are put upon an
equality; so that, if it were conceded that the assertion
responds to some of the propositions affirmed, and is valid,
the act nevertheless remains undefended, for any one of the
propositions affirmed is fatal to its validity. But it cannot
be justly conceded that the classification is valid. When the
question is examined it will be found that the proposition that
the equality of the classification rescues it from condemnation has not the poor merit of plansibility. It is, indeed, so
thinly appareled even in plausibility that when brought to
the touchstone of principle all semblance of strength van-ishes. The General Assembly has no power to classify
voters except as the Constitution provides, no matter what
system it may adopt This is so for the invincible reason
that the prerogative of conferring and defining the right of'
suffrage is that of constitution makers, and not that of the.
creatures of constitutions. The electors who frame constitutions, and give being and power to Legislatures, are above
the created things, and legislators cannot reach above themselves to the source of their power, and the authors of theirexistence, for the purpose of enlarging or restricting the
sovereign right of suffrage. If it were otherwise legislators
would be the masters, and masters they are not If the
Legislature can limit or even define the right of suffrage
then it is greater than its constituency; but it can do
nothing of the kind, for the right of suffrage is not subjeet
to legislative power. The right of suffrage is a political
right of the highest dignity. It is a right of which, as the
Cdurts have declared, no department of government, nor all
of them combined, can divest the citizen otherwise than in
the mode, and to the extent, expressly authorized by theConstitution: Slate v. Adams (1829), 2 Stew. (Ala.) 239.
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It is because the right of suffrage is a political right abiding
in the fountain of power that the Legislature cannot lay so
much as a finger upon it except when expressly authorized
by the organic law, and for this reason it is that the Legislature cannot make a classification of its own, no matter
whether there is or is not equality. It is because the rightf
of suffrage is a political right, as has been decided by the
supreffie court of the United States, and by other courts,
that the provisions of the Constitution respecting the bestowal of special privileges and immunities have no applicaThese decisions
tion to legislation upon that subject.
demonstrate the proposition that those provisions apply only
to rights in the nature of property interests, and not at all
to political rights: Minor v. I-afiersell (1874), 21 Wall.
(88 U. S.), 178; Bradwell v. Slate (1872), 16 Wall. (83 U.
S.), 138; Almty v. Smith (1822), i Litt. (Ky.) 342 ; Anderson v. Baker (I865), 23 Md. 531 ; Iz re Taylor (1877), 48
Md: 28 ; Brown v. H-mmell (1847), 6 Pa. 86.
To me it seems very clear that neither the decisions made
under those constitutional provisions nor the provisions
themselves can have the remotest relevancy to cases involving only high political rights of which constitutions are the
framers and rulers. The right of suffrage is one for the consideration of the people in their capacity as creators of constitutions, and is never one for the consideration of the
Legislature, except in so far as the Constitution authorizes a
regulation of its mode 7of exercise. The people create, define, and limit their own right to vote. No Legislature can
do that for them, although the Legislature may be authorPower
-ized to regulate the mode of exercising this right.
to regulate the exercise of the right is not power to legislate
upon the substantive right itself. The right is a transcendent one, and is far beyond legislative dominion. It would,
therefore, .be illogical in the extreme to assert that. the
framers of the Constitution meant to prohibit class legisl':tion upon a subject where, without an express grant of
power, there is no authority to legislate at all. The provisions of section thirteen assume to do much more than
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prescribe a mode of procedure. They assume to legislate
upon the substantive right itself, and to prescribe conditions
precedent to the right to vote. They do more than declare
what evidence a citizen whose right is challenged shall produce; they assume to declare what he shall do before he can
acquire the character of a voter. If its provisions are of
any force at all they require that the citizen shall be a taxpayer, and, as such, recorded; that he shall not 6nly reside in
the State and county six months, but that he shall also swear
that he intends to become a qualified elector; and they also
require that a citizen, although he is otherwise as fully
qualified as the Constitution requires, who has been temporarily absent, shall swear that he has not voted elsewhere.
Elliott, Supp. § 1335. These requirements, every one of
them, concern the substantive right, and add qualifications
to those prescribed by the paramount law to which all legislation must yield. The supreme court of Oregon, in a
strongly reasoned opinion, denies that registry can be considered a matter of procedure, and says: "The true view of.
this question seems to be that stated in Slate.v. Baker (1875),
38 Wis. 86, that, where registry is required as a prerequisite
to the right to vote, such registry is a condition precedent to
the right itself" U/kite v. Comnissioners(1886), 13 Or.
322. In the course of the opinion it is said: "But under
this act he who goes to the polls on election day possessing
every constitutional qualification may find that the Legislature has stepped in between him and the Constitution. He
finds his vote denied, because he has not done something
which the Legislature has required him to do. He discovers that he is not a qualified elector, and yet he is told that
his omission to do the act which had the effect to disqualify
him is not a disqualification." The Court adopts as the law
the statement of Mr. Drake, that "every definition of the
qualification is but a statement of the terms on which the
men may vote, and in every instance such definitions refer
to what a party has done, as well as what he may do. They
sy to the voter: ' If you have done certain things you may
vote.'" The thirteenth section of the act before us does say
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to the citizen what he musf do in order to be entitled to
vote, and in doing this it assumes to prescribe the terms
upon which he may vote, thus stepping in between him and
the Constitution and adding qualifications to those which
that instrument requires. That the legislation embodied
in section thirteen does assume to control the substantive
right itself, and that this assumption of power is in direct
and irreconcilable hostility to the Constitution, is a conclusion which seems to me to be beyond debate.
MITCHELL, J., (dissenting.) Those provisions of the Constitution which define the right of suffrage, and prescribe
the qualifications of persons entitled to its exercise, and those
statutes, which lo6k to the guarding of the purity of elections, and the integrity of the ballot box, demand the gravest and most deliberate consideration whenever they are
drawn into judicial discussion. The right of the citizen who
possesses the requisite qualifications to vote, is to be jealously
protected, and any statute; the effect of which is to abridge,
alter, or add to the constitutional qualification of the voter,
or which imposes qualifications other than those prescribed
by the Constitution, must necessarily fall under condemnation when subjected to a judicial test: McCafferly v. Gzyer
(1868), 59 Pa. 1O9. On the other hand, the fact must be
kept constantly in view that the duty of prescribing rules
and regulations for the orderly and honest exercise of the
right of suffrage, and of providing reasonable safeguards for
preserving the purity of elections, and for the prevention of
frauds upon the ballot box, has been committed to the Legislature; and when the judiciary ventures to strike down a
statute enacted by the immediate representatives of the people in response to a demand for purer elections, being without power to provide another in the place of the one destroyed, it should be able to rest its decision upon ground
that is absolutely sure and impregnable. The purity of
elections is subserved quite as effectually by the rigid exclusion of those who are not entitled to vote as by protecting
the privilege of those -%ho are. It has been said and re-
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peated a thousand times that courts have no concern with
the policy, convenience or expediency of a public law.
These are questions solely for the legislature. Any decision, therefore, which obliterates from the public law of the
State a statute designed to prevent fraudulent voting, and to
give effect to the ballots of honest voters, should rest broadly
upon the safe ground that the statute blotted out by the
Court is in clear violation of some express provision of the
Constitution.
The test by which to determine the validity of every legislative enactment upon the subject of suffrage and elections
is this: Does it add any substantive qualification or condition to those prescribed by the Constitution to the right of
the voter to vote, or does it merely afford methods of proof
by which to determine the presence or absence of the qualifications prescribed? If it falls within the class first described, it is unconstitutional and void; if within that last
described, no matter what courts may think of its expediency, it is a valid exercise of legislative power, and is not
subject to judicial interference. If the law is unwise or inexpedient, the Legislature is responsible, and it is for the
people to apply the corrective, and not for the Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature, or run a race
of opinions upon points of reason and expediency with the
law-making power. The courts all agree that the Legislature cannot prescribe conditions to the right to vote which
shall add any substantive qualification to those prescribed by
the Constitution, but it may prescribe modes of proof, such
as test oaths, evidence of freeholders, or any other evidence
which may be deemed efficient to disclose the presence or
absence of the constitutional qualifications.
The Legislature cannot impair or abridge the right of suffrage in those who possess the constitutional qualifications;
but it is clearly within the just and constitutional limits of
legislative power to adopt any reasonable and uniform
regulation affecting the mode of exercising the right, in such
a manner as to facilitate pure, orderly and honest elections,
and, to that end, to require the voter to furnish evidence of
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his qualification by any provision of law not inconsistent
with th right itself: Caeien v. Foster (1832), 12 Pick.
(Mass.) 488. Accordingly, it has been held that an elector
may be required to furnish preliminary proof of his qualification to vote, and that this proof may be required either by a
board of registration at a specified time before the election,
or by an election board before receiving the vote of the
elector: Iz re lcDonouglz (1884), 1O5 Pa. 488.
The necessity [said the Supreme Court of Wisconsin] of preserving the
purity of the ballot box is too obvious for comment, and the danger of its
invasion too familiar to need suggestion. While, therefore, it is incompetent for the Legislature to add new qualifications for an elector, it is
clearly within its province to require every person offering to vote to furnish such proof as it deems requisite that he is a qualified elector: State
v. Lean (1859), 9 Wis. 279.

For example, an act of Congress, defining the qualifications of voters in territories subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, disfranchised bigamists, polygamists, and
others living in prohibited marital relations. The Territo-.
rial Legislature of the Territory of Utah prescribed certain
forms of proof which the voter was required to furnish in
respect to his marital relations. This was recognized as a
legitimate exercise of legislative power: Akfurfky v. Ramsey
(1885), 114 U. S. 15. In like manner, where it was a constitutional condition to the right of suffrage that the voter
had not been engaged in acts of open rebellion against the
authority of the United States, it was held that a provision
requiring the voter to take an oath as evidence or iff proof
of his loyalty, was a proper exercise of power: Blair v.
Ridgely (1867), 41 Mo. 63.
The Constitution prescribes certain qualifications as condi-

tions of the right to vote, but it is wholly silent as to the
manner in which election boards or registration officers, if
such shall be provided for, shall ascertain the presence or ab-

sence of the prescribed qualifications. The fact of sex, citi-"
zenship, age, domicile within the State, township, or voting
-precinct, are inquiries involved in the right of every person
who claims the privilege of voting, and there can be no
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doubt but that the Legislature must either have the power
to prescribe modes of proof upon these subjects or the barriers against friud and the prostitution of the elective fran,chise must be thrown down, so that elections, instead of reflecting the choice of honest voters, become a scramble between corrupt partisans to determine who shall excel in the
pollution of the ballot box. The Legislature must have the
power to provide by law the means of distinguishing the
qualified from the unqualified voters, and this can only be
done by providing a tribunal to decide, and by prescribing
the means of obtaining evidence upon which a decision can
be made. The tribunal which shall decide, and the evidence upon which the decision shall be made, are matters
exclusively within legislative control.
Does the statute in question, when subjected to the tests
proposed, add new and additional qualifications to the right
to vote, or does it merely require the voter to furnish the
evidence that he possesses the constitutional qualifications?
Does it alter or abridge the right to vote, or does it do anything more than afford evidence by which to distinguish the
true from the false voter? The constitutional qualifications
relate to and affect the subjects of sex, citizenship, age, and
domicile; and certain general limitations in respect to the
subjects mentioned are imposed upon the right of suffrage.
Other limitations than those mentioned cannot be imposed
by legislative enactment; but, as has been seen, the Legislature has unlimited and plenary power over the subject
of the methods of proving that the voter possessed the
constitutional qualifications. It is pertinent to inquire to
what extent, if at all, does the statute in question add new
qualifications to the right to vote, or impose additional
limitations than those above upon the exercise of the costi.
tutional right?
The first substantive proposition contained in the statute
is to the effect that any person who, having been a resident
of the State, shall have absented himself therefrom for a
period of six months or more, shall, at least three months
before any election at which he intends to vote, register a
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notice-the form of which is prescribed-of his intention to
become a qualified voter, in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of the county in which he resides. There is 7a
proviso which renders the notice inapplicable to any person
who, six months or more before any election, shall have registeied notice of his intention to hold his residence in this
State during a contemplated absence.. The statute provides
that upon the demand of any challenger or member of the
election board, any person thus absent may be required to
produce a certified copy of the notice so required, to be registered before he shall be entitled to vote, which copy the
clerk is required to furnish -at tfe expense of the county.
Having- produced his certificate of registration, he shall then
be entitled to vote, unless the challenger, or some other
qualified voter of the precinct, shall make a written affidavit
that he knows, or is informed and believes, giving the name
of his informant, that the person offering to vote is. not a
legal voter, in which case the person so offering shall, in addition to his certificate of notice, and his own affidavit4
produce the affidavit of a qualified person as to his right to
vote. Like provision is made in regard to all persons who
shall have gone into any other State or sovereignty with the
intention of becoming voters there, or who have, during
any absence from the State, voted in any other State or sovereignty; and also in regard to any person who shall not
have been a bmza fide resident of this State, and of the
county in which he resides, at least six months prior to any
election at which he offers to vote. It is as plain as any
proposition can be that the provisions of the law relate exclusively to methods of proof by which to ascertain the
constitutional qualification of voters, to distinguish between
the true and the spurious. With the exceptions to be
hereafter noted, they add no new conditions to the right of
any person constitutionally qualified to vote, nor do they in
the slightest degree impair, alter or abridge the right of any
legal voter to cast his ballot. It is true, a legal voter, when
properly challenged, may be required to furnish certain
proof of his qualification; but until it can be said that the

MORRIS V. POWELIL,

Legislature can neither add to the constitutional qualifications of the voter nor require any proof of those prescribed,
except such as may suit the notions of the judiciary, it is
difficult to find any ground upon which to set aside and
annul the statute. If the Court can obliterate a statute
which requires one method of proof, then any and all other
methods which the Legislature may devise are subject to judicial surveillance. If, as has been truly and forcibly said,
the legislative department, being the nation or State itself,
speaking by its representatives, has a choice of methods,
and is the master of its own discretion, then upon what principle can the Court interfere and declare the particular
method adopted of no effect? State v. Haworlh (1889), 122
Ind. 462.
If the Court can say that a person who has absented himself from the State for six months or more, or one whose
residence for six months dr more prior to the election at
which he intends to vote has been unfixed, and of an ambiguous character, cannot be required, upon being challenged at
the polls, to furnish evidence that his intention was fixed, at
least thr~e months before election, to claim his residence in
the precinct in which he offers to vote, then it can for the
same reason adjudge that he shall not be required to prove,
by the oath of a freeholder of the precinct, that he is a legal
voter therein. If the requirement that he shall produce a
certificate showing his intention a specified time previous to
the election is adding a new qualification, then the requirement that he shall procure the oath of a freeholder is doing
the same thing. The reasons which serve to annul one
statute which prescribes a particular method of proof are
equally potent to strike down any statute which prescribes
methods of proof The result will be that the Legislature'
must either tie the hands of election boards, and leave the
ballot box open for the reception of honest and fraudulent
votes alike, or it must feel its way blindly until it strikes a
method of proof which shall pass judicial scrutiny. Requiring a person who offers to vote to produce a certificate when
he is challenged, on the ground of noresidence, showing
VOL. XXXVIII-55.
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that he had declared his purpose to claim the right of suffrage before the heat, pressure, and excitement of election
day, free from the solicitation of partisan friends, is not in
any sense imposing an additional qualification, or abridging
the right to vote, any more than requiring a voter to go to a
specific place to vote, or to cast his ballot between specified
hours on a given day, or to fold his ticket in a prescribed
manner, or to prove by his own oath or the oaths of other
parties his right to vote when challenged: Stale v. Bulls
(1884), 31 Kan. 537. As is pertinently said by BREWER, J.,
in the case last cited:
If the Legislature has the right to require proof of a man's qualification,
it has a right to say when such proof shall be furnished, and before what
tribunal; and, unless this power is abused, the courts cannot interfere.

It is no argument which a court can consider at all, to
suggest that isolated instances may occur where a person absent from-the State may be prevented, fronif sickness or other
unavoidable cause, from registering the required certificate
within the time prescribed; and it is equally impertinent to
suggest that the nature of the employment of others may
render it inconvenient, or even expensive, to return to the
State, at or prior to a designated time, in order to record a
declaration of their intention to vote. All laws designed
for the prevention of great wrongs impose hardships occasionally on good men, while holding back the horde of evil
doers, for whose restraint they were enacted. They are not,
however, for that reason to be declared unconstitutional. It
might, with equal reason, be urged that the law requiring
electors to cast their ballots on a particular day, at a specified
place, was unconstitutional because it omitted to make provision for those too sick to attend the polling place, or for
those who are unavoidably absent from the State on election
day. Nearly every law that has ever been passed requiring
registration of some kind, to be completed a specified time
before election day, has been assailed with these argunients;
but in no case that has b en followed as authority have these
arguments proved availing: State v. Butts, suhra, and
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authorities cited; Patterson v. Barlow (1869), 6o Pa. 54;
Peoble v. Hoffman (1886), x6 Ill. 587.

Notwithstanding an isolated decision or two to the contrary, the authorities overwhelmingly sustain those provisions in election laws which require voters to afford the
means for determining their qualifications prior to the haste
and confusion of election day; and, while exceptional cases
of inconvenience or hardship may arise, this is nothing
more than may often result from the fact that the right to
vote is fixed at a certain place, on a certain day, and between
fixed hours. Hardship or inconvenience is no test of the
constitutionality of a law. Besides, what objection can an
honest voter make to a law that enables him, by his own
act, to release himself of the unfounded aspersions which
unfriendly partisans are always ready to cast upon him
when, after a temporary absence from the State, he presents
himself at the polls to vote? What better or more satisfactory evidence can there be of a residence complete and
maintained than the personal appearance of the elector on
the day of election, claiming his vote, with a certified copy
of a declaration made betore the dust and smoke of the
campaign had arisen, showing that the question of residence
was not an afterthought engendered by the heat and excitement of the campaign? Is not such a law as this promotive of honest voting? And does it not afford to aui
honest voter a safe and dignified method of establishing his
residence without being compelled to deliver himself over
to the ward politicians to be "put through" according to
the devious methods which are sometimes practiced? Without question, a law like this will sometimes work a hardship
to an honest man, but that is not the fault of the law. The
fault lies in the conditions which require the enactment of
such a law. Is it necessary, because an honest man may occasionally suffer wrong or inconvenience, to nullify the statute, with the sure consequence to follow that illegal voters
and rogues shall have full swing to debauch the ballot box
without let or hindrance? As was, in effect, said in Pattersoz v. Barlow, sitqpra: What injustice is d6ne to the real
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electors by requiring all those without fixed residences, or
who have maintained an ambiguous residence, to appear in
person before some officer, and declare their residence at a
specificd time before election day? What clause of the
Constitution forbids that a voter should be required to furnish evidence of his residence beforehand, rather than engage in a scramble for dubious evidence in the hurry and
confusion of election day?
The Act is assailed because it is said the Constitution imposed upon the Legislature the duty of providing by a general law for the registration of all voters, and that inasmuch
as this statute only requires certain persons whose residence
is of an ambiguous character to register, it is therefore' void.
Whether a law is general or not, does not depend upon the
number of persons who fall within its scope or operation.
Laws are general, not because they operate upon every person in the State, but because every'person who is brought
within the relations and circumstances as provided for is
affected by the laws: Hancock v. Yaden (1889), 121 Ind.
366-374. The statute under consideration affects no particular class of persons. It affects all alike who come within
the relations and circumstances upon which it operates.
The only fair assumption is that the law is aimed at persons
who seek to vote illegally. Any other assumption is a
reflection upon the Legislature that ought not to be made.
It is in some respects a misnomer to call the statute in
question a registry law. While it is quite true the words
"register" and "registration" are employed in the statute,
its provisions bear little or no resemblance to a registry law.
The Act simply provides for certain modes of proof in the
cases of persons who offer to vote, upon the subjects of their
residence. This proof is not required to be made to a board
of registration, or before a registering officer, but to the election board. The evidence required is to consist of a written
declaration or statement made by the elector, and filed "with
a public officer such a length of time before the election as
to rebut any presumption that the pretense bf residence is
m erely to secure the right to vote. The sole purpose of the
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statute is to provide a method of proving residence, and not
to secure a registry of voters of a particular class. The
statute is to be judged, not by what it is called, but by its
language, scope and purpose. But conceding it to be a law
requiring a partial registration, by which is meant a registration which applies to all citizens under certain conditions
or circumstances, while it has no application to others in a
different situation, can the statute be maintained? The
question is not a new one. It has been decided in the
affirmative again and again"by courts of the highest authority in the land. A constitution would indeed be "deformed
and sterile" if a law designed to protect the ballot box in
great centers of population from falsehood and fraud, should
fall under condemnation because it did not also include the
rural districts, where the necessity for such a law did not
exist. Equally sterile and deformed would be a constitution
under whose provisions a law could be justly condemned
which required proof of a specified kind as to the qualification of all voters under a given state of circumstances, becaiise it omitted to require the same kind of proof from all
other persons, whether they came within or under the designated circumstances or not.
Let it be conceded that the Constitution requires the
Iegislature to provide for the registration of all voters in
the State, how does it logically follow that it prohibits the
enactment of a law which requires all voters under certain
conditions, viz., those having for tfae time being no fixed
"residence,
to register a notice of their intention to claim the
right to vote in a particular voting precinct? Premise: It
was the duty of the Legislature to enact a general registry
law. This duty it has failed to perform. Conclusion: Hay*ing failed to perform this duty, the courts will declare any
law that it may enact requiring voters when challenged on
election day to furnish certain proof of their qualification to
vote unconstitutional. This is the argunent in substance.
To say that because the Legislature omitted to perform a
given duty, it is thereby prohibited from taking any step in
-the direction of the duty prescribed, is to violate all legal

MORRIS V. POWVLL.

precedents, as well as to go against all logical reasoning.
The rule is that a body invested with a certain power may
exercise the power with which it is invested to any degree
not in excess of the whole. So when the chief executive,
being invested with the whole pardoning power, paroled a
prisoner on condition of good behavior, it was contended
that he must exercise the whole power or none. It was
held, however, that being invested with the whole power it
was lawful for him to exercise it in any degree. Accordingly,
too, it has been held in numerous cases where the enactment
of laws providing for a uniforn system of registration was
required, that statutes requiring voters, in certain designated
cities, or in cities of a certain class, to register within a
specified time prior to any election was valid: Pattersonv.
Barlow, szura; State v. Bulls, szura; Peoble v. Hofinan,
supra. These decisions recognize the principle that the
purity of the ballot box must be protected from the local
and particular frauds and evil practices which are known to.
exist, and which disfignre and destroy the freedom and fairness of elections. Any other interpretation of the Constitution must operate as an incentive to fraud, which the Legislature is without power to arrest. Laws designed to protect
the ballot box must strike at the pernicious practices which
are known to be employed in order to nullify the vote of
the honest voter. A law blind to the vicious methods of
the dishonest politician, applied alike to every voter, might
prove a delusion and a snare. A registry law which made
no different provision for the registration and proof of domicile of those having no fixed abode from that required of
permanent residents would be an absurdity. .To say that a
law is to be so general that it must open the door for the
very evils it was intended to gard against is to effectually
tie the hands of the Legislature from enacting any law to
preserve the purity of the ballot box: Comm. v. McClelland
.(i886), 83 Ky. 686.
In so far as the law seems to require a voter who moves
from one county to another, to register a notice of his intention to vote in the county to which he removes, three
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months before the election, it is in my opinion invalid:
Page v. Allen (1868), 58 Pa. 338; Comm. v. McClelland
(1886), 83 Ky. 686; Attorney Generalv. Detroit, supra. A
voter who moves from one county to another sixty days before an election, is entitled to vote in the township in which
he establishes his residence. This statute seems to require
such a voter to register or give notice three months before
the election of his intention to vote. This cannot be required. To the extent that the statute requires an elector
who moves from one county to another to register more
than sixty days before the election, it adds a new qualification. Nor can the statement be upheld wherein it undertakes to require of any voter, as a condition to his right to
vote, that he should procure a certificate from the auditor of
the county showing that his name had been continuously on
the tax duplicate of the county for a given period. This,
last is a condition that might well imply a property qualifition, and is in addition to those prescribed in the Constitution. As has been, in effect, said, a registry law which
would require a longer residence prior to the time of votingthan that required by the Constitution, or which should require the payment of taxes not required to be paid by constitutional provision, would be void: McCrary, Elect. § 8;
Xinneen v. Wells (1887), 114 Mass. 497.
To the extent that the statute requires persons who haveabsented themselves from the State for a period of six
months or more, or those who have gone into any other
State or sovereignty with the intention of voting therein, or
who have voted in any other State or sovereignty during
any absence from this State, and also to the extent that it
requires persons who have not. been bonafide residents of the
State at least six months before any election at which they
offer to vote, to present the required certificate of their intention, it should be held constitutional and valid. To theextent that it requires persons who have lived in the State
for six months, but who moved from one county to another,.
to present the proof prescribed, and to the extent that it requires proof that the voter has been borne on the tax duplicate, it is invalid.
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[The Constitution of Alabama
begins with "ARTICLE I. DEcLARATION OF RIGHTS," declaring
-"SEc. 32. That temporary absence from the -State shall not
cause a forfeiture of residence once
obtained. SEC. 34. The right of
suffrage shall be protected by laws
regulating elections, and prohibiting, under adequate penalties, all
undue influences from power, bribery, tumult, or other ifnproper
conduct. SEC. 38. No educational or property qualification for suffrage or office, nor any restraint

upon the same, on account of race,
color, or previous condition of
servitude, shall be made by law."
Further on, ARTICLE VIII provides that- "SECTION x. Every
male citizen of the United States,
and every- male person of foreign
birth, who may have legally declared his intention to become a
citizen of the United States before
he offers to vote, who is twentyone years old, or upwards, possessing the following qualifications,
shall be an elector, and shall be
entitled to vote at any election by
the people, 'except as hereinafter
provided: First-Heshall have resided in the State at least one year
immediately preceding tle election
at which he offers to vote. Second
-He shall have resided in the
county for three months, and in
the precinct or ward for thirty
days immediately preceding the
election at which he offers to vote ;
Provided,that the general assembly may prescribe a longer or
shorter residence in any precinct
in any county, or in any ward in
any incorporated city or town,
having a population of more than
five thousand inhabitants, but in
no case to exceed three months:
And Provided, That no soldier,

sailor or marine, in the military or
naval service of the United States,
shall acquire a residence by being
stationed, in this State. SEc. 3.
The following classes shall not be
permitted to register, vote, or hold
office: First-Those who shall
have been convicted of treason,
embezzlement of public funds, malfeasance in office, larceny, bribery,
or other crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary.
Second-Those who are idiots or
insane. SEC. 5. The general assembly shall pass laws not inconsistent with this Constitution, to
regulate and govern elections in
this State, and all such laws shall
be uniform throughout the State.
The general assembly may, when
necessary, provide by law for the
registration of electors throughout
the State, or in any incorporated
city or town thereof, and when it
is so provided, no person shall vote
at any election unless he shall have
registered as required by law."
[Under a somewhat similar
though abbreviated provision in
the Constitution of x819, the State
Supreme Court declared that the
right of suffrage was a privilege
not to be taken away by any or all
departments of the government,
though the citizen might waive or
relinquish the privilege for a
greater temporary advantage: and
a law, giving a citizen the choice of
serving as sheriff with a casting
vote only, or not and voting generally, was declared constitutional:
The State v. Adams (1829), 2 Stew.
(Ala.) 231.
[In Arizona, as in New Mexico,
Utah, Idaho and Montana, the Revised Statutes of the United States
now provide that, after the first
election in each Territory,-" SEC.
186o. At all subsequent elections,
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however, in any Territory hereafter
organized by Congress, as well as at
all elections in Territories already
organized, the qualifications of
voters and of holding office shall
be such as may be prescribed by the
legislative assembly of each Territory; subject nevertheless to the
following restrictions on the power
of the legislative assembly, namely:
First. The right of suffrage and of
holding office shall be exercised
only by citizens of the United
States above -theage of twenty-one
years, and by those above that age
who have declared on oath, before
a competent court of record, their
intention to become such, and
have taken an oath to support the
Constitution and Government of
the United States. Scond. There
shall be no denial of the elective
franchise or of holding office to a
citizen on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.
Third. No officer, soldier, seaman, mariner, or other person in
the Army or Navy, or attached to
troops in the service of the United
States, shall be allowed to vote in
any Territory, by reason of being
on service therein, unless such
Territory is, and has been for the
period of six months, his permanent domicile. Fourth. No person belonging to the Army or Navy
shall be entitled to or hold any civil
office or appointment in any territory."
By Act of Congress, approved March 22, 1882 (22 stat. at

Large 31), it was provided " Stc.
8. That no polygamist, bigamist,
or any person cohabiting with more
than one woman, and no woman
cohabiting with any of the persons
described as aforesaid in this Section, in any Territory, or other
plac&over which the United States
have exclusive jurisdiction, shall
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be entitled to vote at any election
held in any such Territory, or
other place, or be eligible for election or appointment to or be entitled to hold any office or place .of
trust, honor or emolument in, under, or for any such Territory or
place, or under the United States."
(See also special act relating
to Utak, infra.) These requirements were enacted under the
power conferred on Congress by
Article IV of the Constitution,"SEcTIoN 3 . * * The Congress
shall have power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the
United States; and nothing in this
Constitution shall be so construed
as to Prejudice any Claims of the
United States or of dny particular
State."
[Under the Territorial government of Dakota, the validity of a
registration law was considered in
Farrenv. CommissionersofBuffalo
Conty (1888), 5 Dak. 36.
"In
determining the * * question,
we must recur to the organic act
* * and see what power it confers upon the legislature of the territory in reference'to fixing the
qualifications of voters. We find,
upon an examination of its provisions, that the power to prescribe
the qualifications of voters is expressly conferred upon that body.
Under the power thus conferred by
the Congress of the United States,
the legislature, after prescribing various qualifications for voters, says
that in addition to such qualifications, all persons, who ' shall have
complied with the provisions of
any law which is now or may in
the future be in force relating to
the registration of voters, shall be
entitled to vote.' The legislature
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subsequently enacted a law ' relating to the registration of voters'
*
This registration is made by
the law * * a qualification which
the elector must possess before he
will be entitled to vote-not a
mere regulation, as it is in some of
the States having laws on this subject. But the voter has another
means within his power to become
qualified in case he.has failed to
comply with the registry law."
The Court then refers to section
eight of the Act of 1881, c. 122,
giving power to furnish evidence
by affidavit as to his being an inhabitant and the oath of a householder, although not on the register, and proceeds, "To be entitled
to vote, one or other of these requirements must be met by the
elector, and a failure to do so renders him disqualified to exercise
the right of suffiage. If the law
in this regard were intended as a
mere regulation, instead of a qualification, the rule would not be so
strict. But, in our opinion, it
makes the requirements of this
law just as essential to the qualification of a voter in this territory
as the attainment of majority, or
the time of residence in the territory or precinct. * * We are
therefor of the opinion that the
registry law * * is valid, and a
compliance therewith constitutes a
qualification of suffrage."
[The Constitution of Arkansas,
in the Article (III) on Franchise
and Elections, provides, "SEcTION
I.
Every male citizen of the
United States, or male person who
has declared his intention of becoming a citizen of the same, of the
age of twenty-one years, who has
resided in the State twelve months,
and in the county six months, and
in the voting precinct or ward one

month, next preceding any election, where he may propose to
vote shall be entitled to vote
at all elections by the people.
SEc. 2. Elections shall be free and
equal. No power, civil or military,
shall ever interfere to prevent the
free exercise of the right of suffrage ; nor shall any law be enacted
whereby the right to vote at any
election shall be made to depend
upon any previous registration of
the elector's name; or whereby
such right shall be impaired or forfeited, except for the commission of
a felony at common law, upon lawful conviction thereof."
[In California, The Declaration
of Rights in the First Article of the
Constitution of 1879, provides"SEC. 24. No property qualification shall ever be required for any
person to vote or hold office." By
the Second Article-" SEcTION I.
Every native male citizen of the
United States, every male person
who shall have acquired the rights
of citizenship under and by virtue
of the treaty of Queretaro, and
every male naturalized citizen
thereof, who shall become such
ninety days prior to any election,
of the age of twenty-one years, who
shall have been a resident of the
State one year next preceding the
election, and of the county in which
he claims his vote ninety days, and
in the election precinct thirty days,
shall be entitled to vote at all elections which are now or may hereafter be authorized by law; provided, no native of China, no idiot,
no insane person, or person convicted of an infamous crime, and
no person hereafter convicted of
embezzlement or misappropriation
of public money, shall ever exercise the privileges of an elector in
this State. SEc. 4. For the pur-
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-pose. of voting, no person shall
be deemed to have gained or lost a
residence by reason of his presence
or absence while employed in the
service of the United States, nor
while engaged in the navigation of
the waters of this State, or of the
United States, or of the high seas;
nor while a student at any seminary of learning; nor while kept at
any alms-house, or other asylum, at
public expense; nor while confined
in any public prison." Among the
Miscellaneous Subjects in Article
XX, is the provision, that-" SEC.
i. "
The privilege of free suffrage shall be supported by laws
regulating elections, and prohibiting, under adequate penalties, all
undue influence thereon from
power, bribery, tumult, or other
improper practice."
[In Webster v. Byrnes (1867), 34
Cal. 273, the names of the voters
were not on the poll list, and the
Court held "Neither was entitled
to vote. It is so expressly provided in the twenty-ninth section
of the Registry Act." The Court
in this case also held that the fact
that the name was first entered on
the poll list and then afterwards
erased by the Board of Registration, made no difference, saying
"His name was not on the poll
list on the day of election, and
therefore he was not entitled to
vote.
Under the twenty-fourth
section, the Board of Registration,
at their final meeting, commenced
on the third day next preceding
the election, are expressly required
to revise the poll list and to erase
the names of all persons not then
actually residing in the district, or
who are not qualified electors, or
are not for any reason entitled to
remain enrolled."
To the same
effect: Prestonv. Cutlbertson(1881),

58 Cal. 198, 208. Both of these
were contested election cases and
the addition of a qualification was
not contested.
[In Colorado, the Bill of Rights,
in Article II of the Constitution,
declares- " SEc. 5. That all elections shall be free and open ; and
no power, civil or military, shall at
any time interfere to prevent the
free exercise of the right of suffrage."
By Article VII-" SECTioN i. Every male person over
the age of twenty-one years, possessing the following qualifications,
shall be entitled to vote at all elections: First.-He shall be a citizen of the United States or, not
being a citizen of the United States,
he shall have declared his intention according to law, to become
such citizen, not less than four
months before he offers to vote.
Second.-He shall have resided in
the State six months immediately
preceding the election at which he
offers to vote, and in the county,
city, town, ward, or- precinct, such
time as may be prescribed by law:
Provided, That no person shall be
denied the right to vote at any
school district election, nor to hold
any school district office, on account of sex. SEC. 4. For the
purpose of voting and eligibility to
office, no person shall be deemed
to have gained a residence by reason of his presence, or lost it by
reason of his absence, while in the
civil or military service of the
State, or of the United States, nor
while a student in any institution
ot learning, nor while kept at public expense in any poor house or
other asylum, nor while confined
in public prison. SEC. ii. The
General Assembly shall pass laws
to secure the purity of elections
and guard against abuses of the
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elective franchise."
[In Connecticut, the Constitution
of 1818, as amended in 1845, and
1876, fixed the qualifications of
electors thus-"Suc. 2.
Every
[white] male citizen of the United
States who shall have attained the
age of twenty-one years, who shall
have resided in this State for a
term of one year next preceding,
and in the town in which he may
offer himself to be admitted to the
privileges of an elector, at least
six months next preceding the
time he may so offer himself, and
shall sustain a good moral character, shall, on his taking such oath
as may be prescribed by law, be an
elector." By the Eleventh Amendment, adopted in October 1855,
"Every person shall be able to read
any Article of the Constitution, or
any section of the statutes of this
State, before being admitted an
elector..' The Sixth Article of the
Constitution also directs that"ScTr. 5. The selectmen and town
clerk of the several towns shall decide on the qualifications of electors, at such times and in such
manner as may be prescribed by
law.
S=T.6.
Laws shall be
made to support the privilege of
free suffrage, prescribing the manner of regulating and conducting
meeting of electors, and prohibiting under adequate penalties, all
undue influence therein, from
power, bribery, tumult and other
improper conduct."
[In Hyde v. Brusk (1867), 34
Conn. 454, it appeared that the
plaintiff's name was upon the perfected registry list of the town and
upon that used at the polls, but his
right to vote was challenged, and
he was referred by the defendant to
the selectmen and the town clerk
who determined he had no right to

vote. The Superior Court charged
the jury in substance, that the perfected registry list of electors was
conclusive, and consequently the
right to challenge on the day of
election did not exist, and the question then raised was whether this
decision was correct. ChiefJustice
HINMAN said. "We think it was
correct. The right of challenging
illegal voters at the elector's meetings existed until the act of i86o,
and there is no doubt that the moderator in this case acted in strict
conformity to the previous law.
But in 186o the law in respect to
the registration of voters at elector's meetings was revised. * *
The Act is * * intended to provide for the making of a full and
complete list of all persons having
the right to vote at an approaching
election, except only those who
might become of age or be naturalized between the last meeting of the
board and the day of election. The
object was to prevent the interruption of the elector's meetings by
any enquiry as to the right of voting beyond the inspection of the
perfected list of electors. It is no
doubt true that an elector may remove from the town betveen the
last meeting of the board of registration and the day of the election,
and so the statute, by making the
registration conclusiv as to the
right, may authorize a person to
vote who is not in fact a resident of
the town on the very day of the
election. * * But if it be assumed that this is an imperfection
in the law, overlooked at the time
of its enactment, it is still true, we
think, that it was intended that the
action of the board of registration
should be final and conclusive upon
all the cases acted upon by them at
their last meeting previous to the
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day of the election. The board of
registration is the board to decide
upbn the qualification of persons to
become electors, and they are acting in the capacity of judges in
making the perfected list, as well
as in the admission or rejection of
new applicants for admission as
electors."
[The Constitution of Delaware,
in Article I reserves out of the general powers of government that"SEc. 3.
All elections shall be
free and equal." Article IV, as
amended January 30, 1855, provides that-" SEcT oN x. All elections for governor, senators, representatives, sheriffs and coroners
shall be held on the [second Tuesday of November] on the Tuesday
next after the first Alonday in the
wontlh of November of tMe year,
and be by ballot; and in such elections every free white male citizen
of the age of tventy-two years or
upwards, having resided in the
State one year next before the election, and the last month thereof in
the county where he offers to vote,
and having within two years next
before the election, paid a county
tax, which shall have been assessed
t least six months before the election, shall enjoy the right of an
elector; and every free -whitemale
citizen of the age of twenty-one
years, and tinder the age of twentytwo years, having resided as aforesaid, shall be entitled to vote without payment of any tax: Provided,
that no person in the military,
naval, or marine service of the
United States, shall be considered
as acquiring a residence in this
State, by being stationed in any
garrison, barrack, or military or
naval place or station within this
State, and no idiot, or insane person, or pauper, or person convicted

of a crime deemed by law [a] felony, shall enjoy the right of an
elector,; and that the legislature
may impose the forfeiture of the
right of suffrage as a punishment
for crime."
[The Fourteenth Article of the
Constitution of Floridadefines the
eligibility of voters in-" SECTION
i. Every male person of the age
of twenty-one years and upwards,
of whatever race, color, nationality, or previous condition, who
shall, at the time of offering to
vote, be a citizen of the United
States, or who shall have declared
his intention to become such in
conformity to the laws of the
United States, and who shall have
resided and had his habitation,
domicile, home and place of permanent abode in Florida for one
year, and in the county for six
months next preceding the election
at which he shall offer to vote,
shall, in such county, be deemed a
qualified elector at all elections
under this Constitution. Every
elector shall, at the time of his
registration, take and subscribe to
the following oath: I,
-,
do
solemnly swear that I will support,
protect and defend the Constitution
and government of the State of
Florida, against all enemies, foreign
or domestic; that I will bear true
faith, loyalty and allegiance to the
same, any ordinances or resolution
of any State Convention or Legislature to the contrary notwithstanding. So help me God. SEc.
2. No person under guardianship,
non comfios mentis, or insane, shall
be qualified to vote at any election;
nor shall any person convicted of
felony be qualified to vote at any
election, unless restored. to civil
rights. SE. 3. At any election
at which a citizen or subject of any
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foreign country shall offer to vote
under the provisions of this Constitution, he shall present to the
persons lawfully authorized to conduct and supervise such elections,
a duly sealed and certified copy of
his declaration of intention, otherwise he shall not be allowed to
vote; and any naturalized citizen
offering to vote, shall produce before said persons lawfully authorized to conduct and supervise the
election, the certificate of naturalization, or a duly sealed and certified copy thereof; otherwise he
shall rot be permitted to vote.
SEc. 6. The Legislature, at its first
session after the ratification of this
Constitution, shall by law provide
for the registration, by the Clerk of
the Circuit Court in each county,
of all the legally qualified voters in
each county, and for the returns of
elections; and shall also provide
that after the completion, from
time to time, of such registration,
no person not duly registered according to law, shall be allowed to
vote. SEC. 7. The Legislature
shall enact laws requiring educational qualifications for electors
after the year one thousand eight
hundred and eighty, but no such
laws shall be made applicable to
any elector who may have registered or voted at any election preious thereto."
In Georgia, the Constitution of
1877 provides, in Art. II,
i, Par.
II. "Every male citizen bf the
United States (except as hereinafter provided), twenty-one years
of age, who shall have resided in
this State one year nekt preceding
the election, and shall have resided
.six months in the county in which
he offers to vote, and shall hdve
paid all taxes which may hereafter
be required of him, and which he

may have had an opportunity of
paying, agreeably to law, except
for the year of the election, shall
be deemed an elector: Provided,
that no soldier, sailor or marine in
the military or naval service of the
United States, shall acquire the
rights of an elector by reason of being stationed on duty in this State;
and no person shall vote, who, if
challenged, shall refuse to take the
following oath, or affirmation: ' I
do swear (or affirm) that I am
twenty-one years of age, have resided in this State one year, and in
this county six months, next preceding this election. I have paid
all taxes which, since the adoption
of the present Constitution of this
State, have been required of me,
previous to this year, and which I
have had an opportunity to pay,
and I have not voted at this election.'
2, Par. I. The General
Assembly may provide, from time
to time, for the registration of all
electors, but the following classes
of persons shall not be permitted
to register, vote, or hold any office,
or appointment of honor or trust
in this State, to wit: ist. Those
who shall have been convicted, in
any Court of competent jurisdiction, of treason against the State,
of embezzlement of public funds,
malfeasance in office, bribery or
larceny, or of any crime involving
moral turpitude, punishable by the
laws of this State with imprisonment in the penitentiary, unless
such person shall have been pardoned. 2d. Idiots and insane persons."
[Under the previous statute of
August 7, 1872, amending the
charter of the City of Savannah
(Code of 1873, page 871), a registration for municipal elections was
required by the clerk of the Coin-

MORRIS V. POWLL.
mon Council, during certain
months, upon the personal application of an elector. (The present
provisions are substantially similar: Code of 1882, page 1255).
Certain citizens and taxpayers asked for an injunction against the enforcement of this law], because (I)
it added to the qualification required by the Constitution ; (2) the
tax of one dollar was required to be
paid in lieu of poll tax; (3) an elector was required to take an oath before the clerk; and lastly (4) the
clerk was required to publish a list
of those registered and to furnish
lists to the election boards. But
the Supreme Court decided that
these were not qualifications in addition to those prescribed by the
Constitution. "These, in our opinion, are statutory regulations designed to secure the discharge of
duties [which] citizens may owe
the municipal government and to
protect the purity of the ballot.
" * If it is not competent for
the legislature to provide regulations for the conduct and management of municipal elections-beyond requiring the electors to be
clothed with the constitutional
qualifications-then there would be
an end of all municipal government, for eVery qualified voter of the
county could vote at the municipal
election. If registration is a new
qualification, as is contended for,
so would residence in the corporate
limits be, and each be violative of
*
*
*
*
the Constitution.
Municipal corporations form an exception to the rule which forbids
the legislature to delegate any of
its powers to subordinate subdivisions. Restraints on the legislative power of control must be found
in the Constitution of the State, or
they must rest alone in the legisla-

tive discretion: SPEER, J., McMahon v. The Mayor (i88o), 66 Ga.
217, 223-5.

[Under the Atlanta local option act
and election law of 1885, the United
States District Judge, McCAY,
thought a registration valid though
there was no provision for adding
the names of those who became
competent to vote between the closing of the registration and the
election, if the period was brief, or
not grossly excessive, and proper
for putting the registry into shape
for use at the polls : Weil v. Calhoun
(1885), U. S. Circ. Ct., N. D. Ga.
25 Fed. Repr. 865, 87I. This question has recently obtained from the
State Supreme Court, the more
definite decision that, a period of
two months was so unreasonable
as to avoid a municipal election.
"The true law is that whenever a
registration is ordered, it should
give the voters an opportunity as
near the day of election as practicable, for qualifying themselves as
electors. All the authorities concur in holding that, if the length of
time between the closing of the registration and the election is unreasonable, the election should be held
void. In the case of Statev. But s
(1884), 31 Kan. 537, Judge BREWER
held that for the registration to close
ten days before the election was not
an unreasonable time. His opinion is able and well considered, and
we think, lays down the correct
rule as to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of registration acts: "
The
SIMONS, J., Slephens v.
Mayor, March io, 189o, Sup. Ct.
Ga.
[The Constitution of Idaho is not
at hand, and will be mentioned in
the Legal Notes of a succeeding
number.
[In Illinois, the Bill of Rights in
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the Second Article of the Constitution provides like Pennsylvania
(infra) that-" SECTION iS.
All
elections shall be free and equal."
And in Article VII, the qualifications of legal voters, are that"SECTION i. Every person having resided in this State one year,
in the county ninety days, and in
the election district thirty days
next preceding any election therein, who was an elector in this State
on the first day of April, in the
year of our Lord 1848, or obtained
a certificate of naturalization before any court of record in this
State prior to the first day of January in the year of our Lord 187o,
or -who shall be a male citizen of
the United States, above the age
of twenty-one years, shall be entitled to vote at such election. SEC.
4. No elector shall bedeemed to
have lost his residence in this State
by reason of his absence on business of the United States, of this
State, or in the military or naval
service of the United States. SEC. 5No soldier, seaman ormarine in the
army or navy of the United States
shall be deemed a resident of this
State in consequence of being stationed therein. SEC 7. The General
Assembly shall pass laws excluding from the right of suffrage persons convicted of infamous crimes."
In the Fourth Article, it is also provided that-" SECTIoN 22. The
General Assembly shall not pass
local or special laws in any of the
following enumerated cases, that is
to say: for* * * The opening and conducting of any election,
or designating the place of voting:
• * *%"] Under these Constitutional provisions, a law for the
registration of voters at city or
town elections was passed in 1885.
It was not deemed applicable to a

city or town until such city or
town adopted it at an election held
for that purpose. It required the
courts for such cities or towns as
adopted the law, to appoint an
election board of "hree persons,
one of whom should be of opposite
politics from the other two; and
required registration three weeks
before the day of election, rejecting all proof tendered on that day.
The entire Act was held valid.
The Court declared the Act not to
be local or special; and not to -violate the clause of the Constitution
Oeclaring that all elections must be
equal. MAGRUDEIR, J., in writing
the opinion of the Court quoted.
from, Patterson v. Barlow (1869),
6o Pa. 54, that-" That election is
free and equal where all of the
qualified electors of the precinct
are carefully distinguished from
the unqualified, and are protected
in the right to deposit their ballots
in safety, and unprejudiced by
fraud. That election is not free
and equal where the true electors
are not separated from the falsewhere the ballot is not deposited in
safety, or where it is supplanted by
fraud. It is therefore the duty of
the legislature to secure freedom
and equality by such regulations
as will exclude the unqualified, and
allow the qualified only to vote."
The Illinois Court adds: ' Where
the law-making department of the
government, in the exercise of a
discretion not prohibited by the
Constitution, has declarcd that a
certain period of time is needed for
a specified investigation, it is not
the duty of this Court to declare,
that such period is unreasonably
long."
Elsewhere it is said:
"There must be some tribunal to
decide, whether or not a person is
a citizen of the United States over
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twenty-one years of age, and has
resided in the State one year, in
the county ninety days, and in the
district thirty days. There must
be some fixed rules and regulations,
by which such tribunal is to be
guided, in determining this fact of
citizenship and these periods of residence, There must be a statute,
which shall designate the tribunal
and prescribe the rules and regulations. The passage of such a statute is the legitimate province of
the legislature alone.
It being
conceded, then, that the power to
enact a law for the registration of
voters is vested in the legislature,
the only question for this Court to
determine is, whether the particular enactment how under consideration, is such an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the power
in question, as to amount to a violation of" the Constitution. The
Court reached the conclusion that
it was not: People v. Hoffinan
{x886), x16 Ill. 587; Byler v. Asher
{I868), 47 Id. ioi ; Davis v. School
-Districtin Haverhill (1862), 44 N.
H. 398; U. S. v. Quinn (1870), U.
S. Cir. Ct. S. Dist. N. Y., 8 Blatchf.
48, 59.
In Indiana, before the present
amendment of March 14, 1881, the
Constitution provided-" ARTicr.
II, SECTION 2. In all elections not
otherwise provided for by this
Constitution, every white male citizen of the United States, of the age
of twenty-one years and upwards,
who shall have resided in the State
during the six months immediately
preceding such election; and every
white male of foreign birth, of the
age of twenty-one years and upwards, who shall have resided in
the United States one year, and
shall have resided in this State during the six months immediately
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preceding such election, and shall
have declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States,
conformably to the laws of the
United States on the subject of naturalization, shall be entitled to vote
in the township or precinct where
he may reside." [It will be observed that the amendment struck
out the word "white," and inserted after each use of the words
"six months" these words-" and
in the township sixty days, and in
the ward or.precinct thirty days."]
The Legislature passed a registration law, requiring a twenty days'
registration in the township where
the voter resided; and this was
held void, because it required a
qualification in the voter not required by the Constitution: Quinn
v. State (1871), 35 Ind. 485. A similar decision was rendered in North
Carolina. upon a statute requiring
ninety days' residence when the
Constitution required only thirty:
People v. Canaday (1875), 73 N. C.
198. Similarly, State v. Williams

(1856),

5 Wis. 308; People v.

Teague, decided by the Supreme
Court of North Carolina, May 19,
189o.
[The Constitution of Indiana also
provided in the same article quoted
from (sup ra, page 841) in its Third
Section, that-"No soldier, seaman,
or marine in the army or navy of
the United States, or of their allies,
shall be deemed to have acquired a
residence in the State, in consequence of having been stationed
within the same; nor shall any
such soldier, seaman, or marine
have the right to vote."
And in
the Twenty-second Section of the
Fourth Article, the general assembly is forbidden to pass a local or
special law-" Providing for the
opening and conducting elections
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of State, county, or township officers, and designating the places of
voting."
In Iowa the Constitution of 1857,
(still in force, except as to the
word "white," which was struck
out, by Joint Resolution of March
31, 1868, ratifying amendments to
the State Constitution: Laws, pages
.290-I) provides-" Art. II. SecTIoN
i. Every white male citizen of the
United States, of the age of twentyone years, who shall have been a
resident of the State -six months
next preceding the election, and
the county in which he claims his
vote, sixty days, shall be entitled to
vote at all elections which are now,
or hereafter may be authorized by
law. SEc. 4. No person in the
military, naval or marine service
of the United States shall be considered a resident of this State, by
being stationed in any garrison,
barrack, or military or naval place
or station within this State. SEc.
5. No idiot, or insane person, or
person convicted of any infamous
crime, shall be entitled to the privileges of an elector."
The Legislature passed a law requiring voters to register, and forbidding the reception of any ballot
from a voter not registered: Act
of April 8, I868, Chap. 171, Laws,
pages 242-5. This Act was held to
be valid, as an act regulating the
exercise of the right of voting:
"leaving the right itself untouched" : DILLON, Ch. J., Edmonds vBanbury (1869), 28 Iowa 267.
The Constitution of Kansas provides in Art. V, 4- "The Legislature shall pass such laws as may
be necessary for ascertaining, by
proper proofs, the citizens who
shall be entitled to the right of suffrage hereby established." It was
held that this section authorized a
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law requiring a ten days' previous
registration, prohibiting all from
voting who were not registered:
State v. Bulls (1884), 31 Kan. 537.
[In this case, the question was as
to the constitutionality of the registration act (Laws of 1879, ch. 8o).
It was objected, first, that it conflicted with section seventeen,
Article II, of the Constitution,
and second, that it placed an
additional qualification on the
right of suffrage. The Court held
the first objection was not well
taken, and with regard to -the
second, BREWER, J., who delivered the opinion, after quoting section four of Article V of the Constitution, supra, said, "It seems
to us that this manifestly contemplates a registration prior to the
day of election. * * Requiring
a party to be registered, is not in
any true sense imposing an additional qualification, any more than
requiring a voter to go to a specific
place for the purpose of voting, or
requiring him to prove by his own
oath or the oaths of other parties
his right to vote when challenged,
or that requiring a naturalized foreigner to present his naturalization
papers. Each and all of these are
simply matters of proof, steps to
be taken in order to ascertain who
and who are not entitled to vote.
* * If the legislature has the
right to require proof of a man's
qualification, it has a right to say
when such proof shall be furnished,
and before what tribunal; and
unless this power is abused the
courts may not interfere. * * In
conclusion, we think it may be
affirmed that under the requirements of our Constitution, it is the
duty of the legislature to provide
for a registration of voters ; that it
may provide that such registration
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be completed prior to the day of
election, providing that ample
facilities and time for registering
are prescribed; and it may also prescribe that one not registered shall
not be allowed to vote."
[The qualifications of an elector
in Kansas are stated in sections of
the Fifth Article of the Constitution (which was adopted July 29,
1859,) preceding that just cited"SECTioN i. Every white male
person of twenty-one years and
upwards, belonging to either of the
following classes-who shall have
resided in Kansas, six months next
preceding any election, and in the
township or ward in which he
offers to vote, at least thirty days
next preceding such election-shall
be deemed a qualified elector. xst.
Citizens of the United States; 2d.
Persons of foreign birth who shall
have declared their intention to
become citizens conformably to the
laws of the United States on the
subject of naturalization." In 1867,
the second section was amended
so as to read-" No person under
guardianship, vion comfios -mentis,
or insane; no person convicted of
felony, unless restored to civil
rights; no person who has been
dishonorably dischaiged from the
service of the United States, unless
reinstated; no person guilty of defrauding the government of the
United Sttes, or any of the States
thereof; no person guilty of giving
or receiving a bribe, or offering to
give or receive a bribe; and no
person who has ever voluntarily
borne arms against the government
of the United States, 6r in any
manner voluntarily aided or abetted
in the attempted overthrow of said
government, except all persons
who have been honorably discharged from the military service

of the United States since the first
day of April, A. D. i86i, provided
that they have served one year
or more therein, shall be qualified to vote or hold office in
this State, until such disability
shall be removed by a law passed
by a vote of two-thirds of all the
members of both branches of the
legislature." The usual provisions
concerning absence from the State,
were amended in 1864, so as to read
-"Sc.
3. For the purpose of
voting, no person shall be deemed
to have gained or lost a residence
by reason of his presence or absence when employed in the service of the United States, nor
while engaged in the navigation of
the waters of this State or of the
United States, or of the high seas,
nor while a student in any seminary of learning, nor while kept
at any almshouse or other asylum
at public expense, nor while confined in any public prison; and
the legislature may make provision for taking the. votes of electors
who may be absent from their
townships or wards in the volunteer service of the United States,
or the militia service of this State;
but nothing herein contained shall
be deemed to allow any soldier,
seaman or marine in the regular
army or navy of the United States,
the right to vote."
[In Kentucky, the present Constitution (adopted in i85o) curiously
provides in the Second Article,
Concerningthe Legislative Departvient, that-" Sic. 8. Every free
white male citizen, of the age of
twenty-one years, who has resided
in the State two years, or in the
county, town; or city, in which he
offers to vote, one year next preceding the election, shall be a
voter; but such voter shall have

MORRIS V. POWELL.
been, for sixty days next preceding
the election, a resident of the precinct in which he offers to vote,
and he shall vote in said precinct,
and not elsewhere." The marginal
note in the General Statutes of
1887 , declares the section just
quoted to relate to qualifications of
electors of Representatives in the
Legislature, and the following section those of State Senators"SEc. 15. One Senator for each.
district shall be elected by the qualified voters therein, who shall vote
in the precincts where they reside,
at the places where elections are
by law directed to be held." In
the Third Article, Concerning the
Bxecutive Depiartment, it is provided that-" SEc. 2. The Governor shall be elected for the term of
four years, by the qualified voters
of the State, at the time when and
places where they shall respectively
vote for Representatives. * * * "'
And there is no definition of a
qualified voter. Amongst the General Provisions. of the Eighth
Article is-"SUc. 4. Laws shall
be made to exclude from office and
from suffrage, those who shall
thereafter be convicted of bribery,
perjury, forgery, or other crimes,
or high misdemeanors. The privilege of free suffrage shall be supported by laws regulating elections,
and prohibiting, under adequate
penalties, all undue influence
thereon from power, bribery, tumult,or other improper practices."
And this usual provision-" SEC.
15.
Absence on the business of
this State or the United States,
shall not forfeit a residence once
obtained, so as to deprive anyone
of the right of suffrage, or of being
elected or appointed to any office
under this Commonwealth under
the exceptions contained in this

Constitution.'' Other unusual provisions are-"SEc. 15.
In all
elections by the people, and also by
the Senate and House of Represontatives, jointly or severally, the
votes shall be personally and publicly given, viva voce: Provided,
That dumb persons entitled to suffrage may vote by ballot. SEc. 16.
All elections by the people shall be
held between the hours of six
o'clock in the morning and seven
o'clock in the evening." Amongst
some unusual provisions in the
Bill of Rights (Art. XIII) is."SEC. 7. That all elections shall
be free and equal."
[In Commonwealth v. icClelland
(1886), 83 Ky. 686, the question
"whether the General Assembly
has the power to enact any law requiring qualified voters to be registered before the day of election, as
a condition of the exercise of their
right of suffrage, ahid if so, whether
such law is valid when made local
and not general in its application,"
came up before the Court. Judge
LEwis in delivering the opinion
said: "The right to vote is conferred and the qualifications of
voters subject to the modifications
made by [Amend.] XV of the Constitution of the United States, are
prescribed by section 8, Article II,
of the State Constitution. *
*
The actual exercise of the right to
vote by those possessing the constitutional qualifications is made to
depend upon needful rules and
regulations which the General Assembly may, from time to time,
provide by law, and which section
4, Article VIII of the Constitution
makes its duty to provide. * * It
is true that until the passage
of the act in question, there
never was in this State any law,
general or local in its application,
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requiring an examination at any
other time or place or by any other
officers than on the day of election,
at the place of voting, and by those
-conducting the election, but the
nonexercise of the power proves
nothing more than that the exigency requiring a registration of
qualified voters before the day of
election has not, in the opinion of
the Legislature, heretofore existed." And after quoting the ]an.guage of Cooley in his work on
Constitutional Limitations, page
602, he proceeds, "If, as we think
is beyond question, the Legislature may -without infringing the
constitutional privilege of suffrage,
,enact a general registration law,
-the only way to avoid the conclusion that it may also, in its discretion, enact such a law, local in its
-operation, is to make it appear that
-some provision of the Constitution
-or some right of the qualified voter
would be violated in the latter case
and not in the former; for the end
'sought in each casei is the support
-of the privilege of free suffrage,
which involves the rigid and certain exclusion of those not entitled
-to vote, as well as the protection of
those in the exercise of the privilege who are; and it is not simply
a question of power, but is made
the duty of the Legislature to adopt
such regulations, whether general
or local, as may be necessary to
attain that end in each and every
part of the State. * * In our
opinion we are not authorized to
hold a registration law invalid upon
the sole ground that it is local in
its application; and this view seems
to be in accordance with the current of authority in this country."
[The Constitution of Louisiana,
adopted July 23, 1879, forbids the
.general assembly (in Article 46,)

passing any local or special law"For the opening or conducting
of elections, or fixing or changBy
ing the place of voting."
"ART. 148. No person shall hold
any office, State, parochial or municipal, or shall be permitted to
vote at any election, or act as a
juror, who, in due course of law,
shall have been convicted of treason, perjury, forgery, bribery or
other crime, punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, or who
shall be under interdiction." These
restrictions are repeated in "ART.
187. The following persons shall
not be permitted to register, vote,
or hold any office or appointment
of honor, profit, or trust in this
State, to wit: those who shall have
been convicted of treason, embezzlement of public funds, malfeasance in office, larceny, bribery, illegal voting or other crime punishable by hard labor or imprisonment
in the penitentiary, idiots and insane persons." The qualifications
of a voter are prescribed in "ART.
185. Every male citizen of the
United States, and every male citizen of foreign birth, who has been
naturalized or who may have legally declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States
before he offers to vote, who is
twenty-one years old or upwards,
possessing the following qualifications, shall be an elector and shall
be entitled to vote at any election
by the people, except as hereinafter
provided: i. He shallbe an actual
resident of the State at least one
year next preceding the election at
which he offers to vote. 2. He
shall be an actual resident of the
parish in which he offers to vote at
least six months next preceding the
election. 3. He shall be an actual
resident of the ward or precinct in
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which he offers to vote, at least
thirty days preceding the election.
ART. 186. The general assembly
shall provide by law for the proper
enforcement of the provisions of
the foregoing article: provided,
that in the parish of Orleans, there
shall be a supervisor of registration, who shall be appointed by the
governor, by and with the advice
and consent of the senate, whose
term of office shall be for the
period of four years, and whose
salary, qualifications and duties
shall be prescribed by law. And
the general assembly may provide
for the registration of voters in
other parishes. ART. 188. No
qualification of any kind, for suffrage or office, nor any restraint
upon the same, on account of race,
color, or previous condition shall
be made by law. ART. 193. For
the purpose of voting, no person
shall be deemed to have gained a
residence by reason of his presence,
or lost it by reason of his absence,
while employed in the service,
either civil or military, of this
State, or of the United States; nor
while engaged in the navigation of
the waters of the State or of the
United States, or of the high seas,
nor while a student at any institution of learning."
[The case of Auld v. Wallon
(1857), 12 La. Ann. 129, held that the
certificate of registry was full proof
of the right to vote, and that no
person could vote in New Orleans
who was not the bearer of the same.
The case was decided under the
Act of March 20, 1856, enacted under the Constitution of 1852 which
provided, "ART. ii.
The legislature. shall provide by law that the
names and. residences of all qualified electors of .the city of New Orleans shall be registered, in order

to entitle them to vote; but the
registry shall be free of cost to the
elector."
This provision is now
replaced by Article I86 of the present Constitution.
[In .ine,
the qualificaticns of
electors are fixed by Article II"SEC. I.
Every male citizen of
the United States of the age of
twenty-one years and upwards, excepting paupers, persons under
guardianship, and Indians not
taxed, having his residence established in this State for the term of
three months next preceding any
election, shall be an elector for
Governor, Senators, Representatives, in the town or plantation,
where his residence is so established; and the elections shall be
by written ballot. But persons in
the military, naval or marine service of the United States, or this
State, shall not be considered as
having obtained such established
residence, by being stationed in
any garrison, barrack, or military
place, in any town or plantation;
nor shall the residence of a student
at any seminary of learning entitle
him to the right of suffrage in the
town or plantation where such
seminary is established. No person, however, shall be deemed to
have lost his residence by reason
of his absence from the State in
the military service of the United
States, or of this State."
The
fourth section has a lengthy provision for soldiers voting for Governor, Senators and Representatives;
and the twelfth section of the
Ninth Article, for county officers.
[The
M~aryland Constitution
(ratified by the people, September
18, x867,) regulates the elective
franchise in its First Article"SECTION i. All elections shall
be by ballot; and every. [whitel
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male citizen of the United States,
of the age of twenty-one years, or
upwards, who has been a resident
of the State for one year, and of
the Legislative District of Baltimore City, or of the county, in
which he may offer to vote, for
six months next preceding the election, shall be entitled to vote, in
the ward or election district, in
which he resides, at all elections
hereafter to be held in this State;
and in case any county, or city,
shall be so divided as to form portions of different electoral districts,
for the election of Representatives
in Congress, Senators, Delegates,
or other officers, then, to entitle a
person to vote for such officer, he
must have been a resident of that
part of the county, or city, which
shall form a part 'of the electoral
district, in which he offers to vote,
for six months preceding the election ; but a person, who shall have
acquired a residence in such county
or city, entitling him to vote at
such electioii, shall be entitled to
vote in the election district from
which he removed, until he shall
have acquired a residence in the
part of the county or city to which
he has removed. SEc. 2. No person above the age of twenty-one
years, convicted of larceny or
other infamous crime, unless pardoned by the Governor, shall ever
thereafter be entitled to vote at any
election in this State; and no
person under guardianship, as a
lunatic, or as a person non compos
mentis, shall be entitled to vote.
SEc. 3. If any person shall give,
or offer to give, directly or indirectly, any bribe, present or reward, or any promise, or any security for the payment, or the delivery of money, or any other
thing, to induce any voter to re-

frain from casting his vote, or
to prevent him in *any way
from voting, or to procure a
vote for any candidate, or person proposed, or 'voted for, as
Elector of President and Vice-President of the United States, or Representative in Congress, or for any
office of profit or trust, created by
the Constitution or Laws of this
State, or by the Ordinances, or Authority of the Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, the person
giving, or offering to give, and the
person receiving the same, and any
person who gives, or causes to be
given, an illegal vote, knowing it
to be such, at any election to be
hereafter held in this State, shall
on conviction in a Court of Law, in
addition to the penalties now or
hereafter to be imposed by Law,
be forever disqualified to hold
any office of profit or trust, or
to vote at any election thereafter.
SEC. 5. The General Assembly
shall provide by law for a uniform
Registration of the names of all
the voters in this State who possess the qualifications prescribed
in this Article, which Registration
shall be conclusive evidence to the
Judges of election, of the right of
every person thus registered to
vote at any election thereafter held
in this State; but no person shall
vote at any election, Federal or
State, hereafter to be held in
this State, or at any municipal election in the City of Baltimore, unless his name appears
in the list of registered voters; and
until the General Assembly shall
hereafter pass an Act for the Registration of the names of voters, the
Law in force on the first day of
June, in the year eighteen hundred
in reference
and sixty-seven,
thereto, shall be continued in force,
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except so far as it may be inconsis- held for the purpose of regulating
tent with the provisions of this the local affairs of a town or city
under the provisions of its charter
Constitution; and the registry of
would never be mistaken for a
voters, made in pursuance thereof,
may be corrected, as provided in State election. * * The qualifisaid Law; but the names of all cation to vote was required to exist
persons shall be added to the list of before a person had the right to be
qualified voters by the officers of registered; the registration conRegistration, who have the qualifisisted in making a list of those
cations prescribed in the first sec- who were already duly qualified;
tion of the Article, and who are not and it was made for the purpose of
disqualified under the provisions of being used only at State and Fedthe second and third sections
eral elections, and municipal elections in the City of Baltimore. The
thereof."
[In the Third Article of the State right of an inhabitant of WestConstitution of Maryland there is minster, therefore, to vote for
also a command that-"SEC. 42.
Mayor and Councilmen must deThe General Assembly shall -pass pend on the requirements of the
Constitution, without reference to
Laws necessary for the preservation
of the purity of elections."
the registration list."
[In Anderson v. Baker el al.
[In Smith v. Stephan el als.
(1887), 66 Md. 381, it was averred
(1865), 22 Md. 531, WEISEL, J., in
that the election, a municipal one, passing upon the registration act of
1865, ch. 174, and the right of a
was void because it was carried on
and conducted without, and in the voter applying to be registered, to.
absence of, and without regard to,
decline to take the oaths prescribed
any registry or list of qualified
by such act, upon the ground that
voters, and it was contended that these provisions, both of the law
the fifth section of Article I of the and of the Constitution, were conConstitution governed such elec- trary to, and in conflict with the
tions, and thaf no one should be provisions of section ten of the First
permitted to vote whose name did Article of the Constitution of the
not appear on such list. The United States, and repugnant to
Court in its opinion says, "The
certain Articles of the Bill of
section of the Constitution denies Rights, said, in his concurring
the right to vote at Federal and
opinion, "The right to vote-the
State elections, and municipal elec- question of qualification or disqualtions in the City of Baltimore, to
ification of the person offering to
all persons whose names do not
vote-is to be decided by the tribuappear in the list of registered
nals established by the law for the
voters. It makes no allusion to
ascertainment of the necessary
municipal elections in any other
facts that enter into the inquiry.
town or city. This distinction is Means are appointed and judges
clearly made in the Constitution
provided to determine the question.
'between Federal and State elec* * This power and trust mustbe
tions on one side, and municipal reposed somewhere; and in this
elections on the other. It is im- State, and in all the States of the
possible to mistake the meaning of
Union, it has been committed to
the terms employed. An election judges of election, who are quasi
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judicial officers, clothed with the
powers and discretion necessary for
the performance of the duty. :
The registration of voters is but
another mode for attaining the
same end, introduced into the government of some of the States, and
now authorized in Maryland. It
has the adfantage of ascertaining
before election, who are qualified to
vote at the elections when they arrive. * * I do not regard these
provisions of the Constitution of
this State, or of the Act of Registration as obnoxious to the charge
of being in conflict with the
Constitution of the United States,
or the Bill of Rights of Maryland. "
The opinion of the
Court was delivered by BowrM, C.
J., who said "As far * * as the
registration law is a legislative enactment of the first, second, third,
fourth and fifth sections of Article
One of the Constitution, it is not
restrained by the Declaration of
Rights, because it proceeds from
the same authority, that of the
Convention."
As early as 1832 registration laws
were upheld in .3fassachusetts. [At
that time an amendment to the
Constitution of 1780, provided"ART. III. Every male citizen of
twenty-one years of age and upwards (except paupers and persons
under guardianship), who shall
have resided within the Commonwealth one year, and within the
town or district in which he may
claim a right to vote, six calendar
months next preceding any election
of governor, lieutenant-governor,
senators, or representatives, and
who shall have paid, by himself or
his parent, master or guardian, any
State or county tax which shall,
within two years next preceding
such election, have been assessed

upon him in any town or.district of
this Commonwealth, and also every
citizen, who shall be by law exemptedfrom taxation, andwho shall
be in all other respects qualified as
above mentioned, shall have the
right to vote in such election of governor, lieutenant-governor, senators and representatives, and no
other person shall be entitled to
vote in such elections:" ratified
by the people, April9, I822, and
still in force.
The legislature passed a law, requiring a registration, and provided
for its publication. Unless registered, an elector could not vote:
Statute of February 23, 1822, Chap.
110,
24, ed. 1823, page 598. This
statute was assailed as unconstitutional. In passingupon its validity,
SHAw, C. J., Capenv. Foster( 1832),
12 Pick. (Mass.) 485, said: "This
Court is of opinion, that in all cases
where the Constitution has conferred a political right or privilege,and
where the Constitution has not particularly designated the manner in
which that right is to be exercised,
it is clearly within the just and constitutional limits 6f the legislative
power, to adopt any reasonable and
uniform regulations in regard to the
time and mode of exercising that
right, which are designed to secure
and facilitate the exercise of such
right, in a prompt, orderly and convenient manner. Such a construction would afford no warrant for
such an exercise of legislative
power, as, under the pretence and
color of regulating, should subvert
or injuriously restrain the right itself:" page489.
The Court then points out that
the Constitution does not define
whether the election shall be by
ballot or viva voce, in person or by
proxy, and adds that a statute re-
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quiring an elector to present a
written ballot in person is no doubt
valid; on the ground that it " is a
just exercise of legislative power,
providing an easy and reasonable
mode of exercising the constitutional right, and one calculated to
prevent error and fraud, to secure
order and regularity in the conduct
of elections, and thereby give more
security to the right itself:" page
490.
"The right of any individual
person, claiming the privilege of
voting, may involve an inquiry
into the fact of citizenship, sex,
age, domicile within the Commonwealth, domicile within the town
or district, the payment'of taxes,
exemption by law from the payment of taxes, and the fact of his
being a pauper or under guardianship or otherwise. * * * Is
there anything in the above recited
provision of the Constitution,
ich requires the selectmen to go
through this investigation, during
the progress of the polling, and
whilst many other citizens, whose
right is unquestioned, and proved
by their names being previously
entered on the list, are waiting to
give in their ballots and retire?
There is no express requirement,
and we think there is no implication, arising either from the terms
of the Constitution, or from the
nature and'purposes of the right of
voting, which requires the selectmen to perform this duty, whilst in
the actual performance of other
positive duties, required by the express direction of the Constitution,
and in the careful, exact and
prompt performance of which the
public, the whole body of qualified
voters, have a deep interest:"
pages 491-2.
[This language of SHAw, C.J., is

quoted and relied upon by the
Court in Kinneen v. Wells (1887),
144 Mass. 497, which was an action
of tort against the registrars of
voters, to recover damages for
wrongfully refusing to register the
plaintiff as a voter. The real point
in that case was upon the constitutionality of the statute of 1885,
which provided "SECTION 7- No
person hereafter naturalized in any
court shall be entitled to be registered as a voter within thirty days
(Laws of
of such naturalization."
I885, ch. 345, page 802.) This law,
the Court held to be in conflict
with the Constitution of the Commonwealth, and therefore void. It
was formally repealed by the statute of 1887, ch. 329.
[The Massachusetts Constitution
of 178o also contained in the Declaration of Rights-" ART.IX. All
elections ought to be free; and all
inhabitants of this Commonwealth,
having such qualifications as they
shall establish by their frame* of
government, have an equal right
to elect officers, and to be elected,
This
for public employments."
word inhabitants means citizens"
Opinion; of the Justices (1877) 122
Mass. 595, 596.
[In 1857, the following amendment was added to the above provision of the Constitution of Massachusetts :-"

ART. XX. No per-

son shall have the right to vote, or
be eligible to office under the Constitution of this, Commonwealth,
who shall not be able to read the
Constitution in the English language, and write his name: Provided, however, that the provisions
of this Amendment shall not apply
to any person prevented by a physical disability from complying
with its requisitions, nor to any
person who now has the right to
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vote, nor to any person 'who shall
thereof, shall be deprived of his
be sixty years of age, or upwards,
vote by reason of his absence from
at the time this Amendment shall
the township, ward or State in
take effect."
In 1881, another
which he resides; and the legisAmendment 'was added-" ART.
lature shall have the power and
XXVIII. No person, having served
shall provide the manner in which,
in the army or navy of the United
and the time and place at which
States in time of war, and having such absent electors may vote, and
been honorably discharged from
for the canvass and return of their
such service, if otherwise qualified
votes to the township or ward electo vote, shall be disqualified theretion district, in which they refor on account of being a pauper;
spectively reside, or otherwise.
or if a pauper, because of the non- SEc. 5. No elector shall be deemed
payment of a poll tax."
to have gained or lost a residence,
[The Constitution of Michigan by reason of his being employed
declares in the Seventh Article, that
in the service of the United States,
-"SEciTON I. In all elections,
or of this State; norwhile engaged
every male citizen, every male
in the navigation of the waters of
inhabitant residing in the State on
this State or of the United States,
the twenty-fourth day ofJune, "one or of the high seas; nor while a
thousand eight hundred and thirty- student of any seminary of learnfive; every male inhabitant resid- ing; nor while kept at any almsing in the State on the first day of house or other asylum at public
expense; nor while confined in
January, one thousand eight hundred and fifty, who has declared
any public prison. SEC. 6. Laws
his intention to become a citizen of shall be passed to preserve the purthe United States, pursuant to the
ity of elections, and guard against
laws thereof, six months preceding
abuses of the elective franchise.
an election, or who has resided in
SEC. 7. No soldier, seaman, nor
the State two years and six months,
marine in the army or navy of the
and declared his intention as aforeUnited States, shall be deemed a
said, and every civilized male in- resident of this State, in consehabitant of Indian descent, a
quence of being stationed in any
native of the United States, and
military or naval place in this State.
not a member of any tribe, shall SEc. 8. Any inhabitant 'who may
be an elector, and entitled to vote ; hereafter be engaged 'in a duel,
but no citizen or. inhabitant shall
either a. principal or accessory bebe an elector, or entitled to vote at
fore the fact, shall be disqualified
any election, unless he shall be
from holding any office under the
above the age of twenty-one years,
Constitution and laws of this State,
and has resided in this State three
and shall not be permitted to vote
months,, and in the township or
at any election."
-ward in which he offers to vote, ten
[In People ex rel. Foley v. IKo5days next preceding such ejlection: plekom (1868), 16 Mich. 342, it apProvided,that in time of war, inpeared that there had never been
surrection or rebellion, no qualified
any valid or complete registration'
elector in the actual military serof voters or any legal board of
vice of the United States, or of
registration in the township of
Franklin since the organization of
this State, in the army or navy
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1864, and that at the general election of 1866 a large number of
electors voted without being registered. Here the Court said, "The
statute in question is grounded
upon the same article of the Constitution which gives the right to
vote, and its object, as expressly
declared in the title is, 'further to
preserve the purity of elections,
and guard against the abuses of the
elective franchise, by a registratioi
of electors.' * * It contemplates
general obedience, and continuous
administration, and nowhere, in
terms, makes any provision for its
own nullification, either through
violence, or the negligent or wilful
failure of officers to organize or
preserve boards. It does not speak
the language of a mere offer, or
proposition to the electors, to register or not, but utters the language
of law, unconditional,absolute, iufierative; and declares, that allwho
do not register shall not vote."
The votes were declared void.
[The Seventh Article of the Constitution of Minnesota, as amended
November 3, 1868, declares that" SECTION I. Every male person
of the age of twenty-one years or
upwards, belonging to either of the
following classes, who shall have
resided in the United States one
year, and in this State for four
months next preceding any election, shall be entitled to vote at
such election, in the election district of which he shall, at the time,
have been for ten days resident, for
all officers that now are, or hereafter may be elective by the people.
First. Citizens of the United
States. Second. Persons of foreign
birth, who shall have declared their
intention to become citizens, conformably to the laws of the United
States upon the subject of naturali-

zation. Third. Persons of mixed
white and Indian blood, who have
adopted the customs and habits of
civilization.
Fourth. Persons of
Indian blood residing in this State,
who have adopted the language,
customs and habits of civilization,
after an examination before any
district court of the State, in such
manner as may be provided by law,
and shall have been pronounced by
said court capable of enjoying the
rights of citizenship within the
State. SEC. 2. No person not belonging to one of the classes specified in the preceding section, no
person who has been convicted of
treason or any felony, unless restored to civil rights, and no person
under guardianship or who may be
non compos mientis, or insane, shall
be entitled or permitted to vote at
any election in this State. SEc. 3.
For the purpose of voting, no person shall be deemed to have lost a
residence by reason of his absence
while in the service of the United
States; nor while engaged upon
the waters of this State or of the
United States; nor while a student
of any seminary of learning; nor
while kept at any alms-house or
asylum; nor while confined in any
public prison. SEc. 4. No soldier,
seaman or marine in the army or
navy of the United States, shall be
deemed a resident of this State, in
consequence of being stationed
within the same."
[The present Constitution of
Alississifilii (soon to be abrogated)
declares in the Bill .of Rights (Art.
I) that-" SEC. 18. No property or
educational qualification shall ever
be required for any person to become an elector. ART. VII. SEc.
2.
All male inhabitants of this
State, except idiots and insane persons, and Indians not taxed, citi-
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zens of the United States, or naturalized, twenty-one years old and
upwards, who have resided in this
State six months, and in the county
one month next preceding tne day
of election, at which said inhabitant offers to vote, and who are
duly registered according to the requirements of section three of this
article, and who are not disqualified by reason of any crime, are declared to be qualified electors. SEC.
3. The legislature shall provide, by
law, for the registration of all persons entitled to vote at any election, and all persons entitled to
register, shall take and subscribe to
the following oath or affirmation:
'I,
-,
do solemnly swear (or
affirm), in the presence of Almighty God, that I am twenty-one
years old; that I have resided in
this State six months and in county one month; that I will
faithfully support and obey the
Constitution and laws of the United
States, and of the State of Mississippi, and will bear true faith and
allegiance to the same, so help me
God.'" In Hawkins el al. v. Carroll Co. (1874), 5o Miss. 761, the
Court said, "The second section [of
the Constitution] declares the qualification of voters, their requisite
sex, age, residence in the county
and state, registrati6n, and citizenship of the United States. The.
right of those having the other
qualifications to vote is completed
and evidenced by registration.". In
the same Article, it is provided
that-" SEc. 6. In time of war, insurrection or rebellion, the right to
vote at such place, and in such
manner as shall be prescribed by
law, shall be enjoyed byall persons
otherwise entitled thereto, who
may be in the actual military or
naval service of the United States

or this State: provided, said votes
be made to apply in the county or
precinct wherein they reside."
[The Constitution of Missouri,
adopted in 1865, provided, "ARtICLE II, SEC. 4. The general assembly shall immediately provide by law for a complete and
uniform registration, by election
districts, of the names of qualified
voters in this State; which registration shall be evidence of the
qualification of all registered voters
to vote at any election thereafter
held; but no*person shall be excluded from voting at any election,
on account of not being registered,
until the general assembly shall
have passed an act of registration,
and the same shall have been carried into effect; after which no
person shall vote unless his name
shall have been registered at least
ten days before the day of election;
and the fact of such registration
shall be no otherwise shown than
by the register, or an authentic
copy thereof, certified to by the
judges of election, by the registering officer, or other constituted authority. A new registration shall
be -made within sixty days next
preceding the tenth day prior to
every biennial general election;
and after it shall be made, no person shall establish his right to vote
by the fact of his name appearing
on any previous register." By the
Amendment adopted November 3,
1874, these provisions were condensed to this simple sentence:
"The general assembly shall provide by law for registering all
voters in cities and towns having a
population of more than ten thousand." This was changed in the
present Constitution, ratified by
the people, October 3o, 1875, so as
to read-" ARTICLE VIII. SEc. 5.
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The General Assembly shall provide by law, for the registration of
all voters in cities and counties
having a population of more than
one hundred thousand inhabitants,
and may provide for such registration in cities having a population
exceeding twenty-five thousand inhabitants, and not exceeding one
hundred thousand, but not otherwise."
[It was held that a law allowing
the board of registration up to five,
instead of ten days before the election, within which to complete the
books of registration, was not in
conflict with these provisions, unless the "completion of the books"
be held to authorize a continued
registration of voters down to
within five days of the election,
and unless it appeared that persons
cast their votes within the ten days,*
which the Court considered was
not meant: Ensworlk v. Albin
(1870), 46 Mo. 450.
[The Bill of Rights (Art. II) also
contains the usual declaration (Q9)
for free elections, in precisely the
samewordsusedin Colorado, spi ra,
page 875. In the Fourth Article,
"SEc. 53. The General Assembly
shall not pass any local or special
law: * * For the opening and
conducting of elections, or fixing
or changing the places of voting."
By the Eighth Article-" SEC. 2.
Every male citizen of the United
States, and every male person of
foreign birth who may have dedared his intention to become a
citizen of the United States according to law, not less than one year
nor more than five years before he
offers to vote,"who is over the age
of twenty-one years, possessing the
following qualifications, shall be
entitled to vote at all elections by
the people: First, He shall have

resided in the State one year immediately preceding the election at
which he offers to vote. Second,
He shall have resided in the county,
city or town where he shall offer
to vote at least sixty days immediately preceding the election. SEc.
3. All elections by the people shall
be by ballot,, every ballot shall be
numbered in the order in which it
shall be received, and the number
recorded by the election officers on
the list of voters, oppcite the
name of the voter who presents the
ballot. The election officers shall
be sworn or affirmed not to disclose
how any voter shall have voted,
unless required to do so as witnesses in a judicial proceeding:
Provided, That in all cases of contested elections, the ballots cast
may be counted, compared with
the list of voters, and examined
under such safeguards and regulations as nmay be prescribed by law.
Sic. 5. [supra]. SEc. 7- For the
purpose of voting, no person shall
be deemed to have gained a residence by reason of his presence, or
lost it by reason of his absence
while employed in the service,
either civil or military, of this
State, or of the United States, nor
while engaged in the navigation of
the waters of the State or of the
United States, or of the high seas,
nor while a student of any institution of learning, nor while kept in
a poor-house or other asylum at
public expense, nor while confined
in public prison. SEc. S. No person, while kdpt at any poor-house
or other asylum at public expense,
nor while confined in any public
prison, shall be entitled to vote at
any election under the laws of this
State. SEc. io. The General Assembly may enact laws excluding
from the right of voting, all per-
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sons convicted of felony or other
infamous crime, or misdemeanors
connected with the exercise of the
right of suffrage.
SEc. ii.
No
officer, soldier or marine in the
regular army or navy of the United
States, shall be entitled to vote at
any election in this State."
[A subsequent Act of 1883, "for
the registration of all voters in
cities having a population.of more
than one hundred thousand inhabitants, and to govern electioW in
such cities," was sustained under
the provisions of the Constitution
of 1875, against a contention of
being a local and special law forbidden by Section Fifty-three of
Article Four of the same Constitution, because the exercise of such
power was expressly commanded,
and the act applied not only to existing but to all future cities of the
designated population: Ewing v.
Hoblizelle (1884), 85 Mo. 64, reversing S. C. 15 Mo. App. 441.
[The Constitution of Alontana
declares, in the Bill of Rights (Art.
III) the freedom of elections, (R5)
in precisely the same words used
in Colorado, supbra, page 875. The
passage of local or special laws for
"the opening or conducting any
election, or designating the place
of voting," is forbidden to the
legislature, by Art. V, section
twenty-six ; while the right of suffrage is defined in the Ninth Article
thus-" SEC. 2. Every male person of the age of twenty-one years
or over, possessing the following
qualifications, shall*be entitled to
vote at all general elections and for
all officers that now are, or hereafter may be, elective by the people,
and upon all questions which may
be submitted to the vote of the
people: First,he shall be a citizen
of the United States; second, he

shall have resided in this State one
year immediately preceding the
election at which he offers to vote,
and in the town, county or precinct such time as may be prescribed bylaw; Provided,first, that
no person convicted of felony shall
have the right to vote unless he
has been pardoned; Provided,second, that nothing herein contained
shall be construed to deprive any
person of the right to vote who
had such right at the time of the
adoption'of this Constitution; Provided, that after the expiration of
five years from the time of the
adoption of this Constitution, no
persons except citizens of the
United Stites shall have the right
to vote. SEc. 3. For the purpose
of voting, no person shall be
deemed to have gained or lost a
residence, by reason of his presence
or absence while employed in the
service of the State, or of the
United States, nor while a student
at any institution of learning, nor
while kept at any alms-house or
other asylum at the public expense,
nor while confined in any public
prison. SEc. 6. No soldier, seaman or marine, in the army or
navy of the United States, shall
be deemed a resident of this State,
in consequence of being stationed
at any military or naval place
within the same. SEc. 8. No idiot
or insane person shall be entitled
to vote at any election in this State.
SEc. 9. The Legislative Assembly
shall have the power to pass a registration and such other laws as may
be necessary to secure the purity of
elections and guard against abuses
of the elective franchise."
[The Nebraska Bill of Rights in
the First Article of the State Constitution varies the usual language
in declaring that-" SEC. 22. All
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elections shall be free; and there
session laws of 1887 (Compiled
Statutes 1887, ch. 26 a.) was conshall be no hindrance or impedisidered. It was contended that it
ment to the right of a qualified
voter to exercise the elective fran- violated section twenty-two of the
chise." Similarly in the Third Ar- Bill of Rights, and Article I of the
ticle-"SEc. 15. The legislature Constitution of the State. REESE,
shall not pass local or special laws J., in delivering the opinion, in
speaking of the Act says, "By the
in any of the following cases, that
foregoing it will be seen that the
is to say: For * * the opening
and conducting of any election, or right of any elector to vote must
depend upon his registration within
designating the place of voting."
The Seventh Article defines the the four days set apart for that purposeland upon the further fact that
right of suffrage, in-" SEcTiON 1.
Every male person of tie age of on election day his name must be
twenty-one years or upwards, be- found by at least three of the
longing to either of the following
judges upon three of the registers.
classes, who shall have resided in If not registered on one of those
the State six months, and in the days-no matter what may have
county, precinct or ward, for the prevented-he cannot vote. If he
has registered and by mistake his
term provided by law, shall be an
elector.
First. Citizens of the name has been left off two of the
United States. Second. Persons of registers, he is equally disfranchised. He cannot register, nor
foreign birth who shall have decan the registry be corrected on
clared their intentions to become
election day. * * Section one of
citizens conformably to the laws of
the United States, on the subject of Article VII, ot the Constitution
* * provides that every male pernaturalization, at least thirty days
prior to an election. Sne. 2. No
son of the age of twenty-one years,
of the classes enumerated "shall
person shall be qualified to vote
be an elector," and, of course, enwho is non compbos mentis, or who
has been convicted of treason or
titled to vote. Would the Act in
question hinder or impede the
felony under the law of the State,
or of the United States, unless re- exercise of that right? The qtiesstored to civil rights.
SEc. 3. tion is not a new one in this counEvery elector in the actual military try and the decisions of the courts
service of the United States, or of
of last resort in the different States
have been substantially unanimous
this State, and not in the regular
army, may exercise the right of in holding such laws absolutely
suffrage at such place, and under
void. It has been quite as unisuch r~gulations as may be pro- formly held that proper and reasonable registration laws are valid, not
vided by law. SEc. 4. No soldier,
seaman or marine in the army or
as imposing an additional necesnavy of the United States, shall be
sary qualification, created by statute, but as a method of firovingdeemed a resident of the State in
the existence of the qualifications
consequence of being stationed
therein. "
required by the Constitution. This
[In Stateex rel.Stearns v. Corner so long as kept within the bounds
et als. (1887), 22 Neb. 265, the con- of reason, is deemed to be a proper
stitutionality of chapter 39 of the
and just protection against fraud
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and a preservation of the purity of
elections, upon which must depend
the safety and perpetuity of republican forms of government. *
The true rule undoubtedly is, that
the legislature may require registration under reasonable restrictions as proof of the possession of
the qualifications prescribed by the
Constitution, but that the voter
shall have the right to prove himself to be an elector, register and
vote at any time prior to the closing of the polls on election day.
"::"Bythe Act under consideration but four days in the year are
given to register, and then only
when three judges are present.
* * The suggestion that such a
law would not be a 'hindrance or
impediment to the right of a qualified voter to exercise the elective
franchise' as is forbidden in the
section of the Constitution above
quoted, is so manifestly unreasonable that the necessity for further
argument ceases."
[The light of suffrage in Nevada
is determined by the Second Article of the Constitution-" SEcTioN
'.Every male citizen of the United
States (not laboring under the disabilities named in this Constitution),
of the age of twenty-one years and
upwards, who shall have actually,
and not constructively, resided in
the State six months, and in the
district or county thirty days next
preceding any election, shall be entitled to vote for all officers that
now are or hereafter may be elected
by the people, and upon all questions submitted to the electors at
such election; provided, that no
person who has been or may be
convicted of treason or felony in
any State or Territory of the
United States, unless restored to
civil rights; and no person who,
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after arriving at the age of eighteen
years, shall have voluntarily borne
arms against the United States, or
held civil or military office under
the so-called Confederate States,
or either of them, unless an amnesty be granted to such by the
Federal Government; and no idiot
or insane person shall be entitled
to the privilege of an elector. SEc.
2. For the purpose of voting, no
person shall be deemed to have
gained or lost a residence by reason of his presence or absence
while employed in the service of
the United States, nor while engaged in the navigation of the
waters of the United States, or of
the high seas; nor while a student
of any seminary of learning; nor
while kept at any almshouse or
other asylum, at public expense;
nor while confined in the public
prison. SEc. 3. The right of suffrage shall be enjoyed by all persons otherwise entitled to the same,
who may be in the military or
naval service of the United States;
provided, the votes so cast shall be
made to apply to the county and
township of which said voters were
bona fide residents at the time of
their enlistment; and, provided
.further, that the payment of a poll
tax or a registration of such voters
shall not be required as a condition
to the right of voting. Provision
shall be made by law regulating
the manner of voting, holding elections and making returns of such
elections, wherein other provisions
are not contained in this Constitution. SEc. 6. Provision shall be
made by law for the regLtration of
the names of the electors within
the counties of which they may be
residents, and for the ascertainnent, by proper proofs, of the persons who shall be entitled to the
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rights of suffrage, as hereby established, to preserve the purity of
elections and regulate the manner
of holding and making returns of
the same; and the legislature shall
have power to prescribe bylaw any
other or further rules or oaths as
may be deemed necessary, as a test
of electoral qualifications. Slc. 7.
The legislature shall provide by
law for the payment of an annual
poll tax of not less than two nor
exceeding four dollars from each
male person resident in the State,
between the ages of twenty-one and
sixty years (uncivilized American
Indians excepted), one-half to be
applied for State and one-half for
county purposes; and the legislature may, in its discretion, make
such payment a condition to the
right of voting." The Fourth Article declares-" Sgc. 2o. The legislature shall not pass local or special laws * * * providing for
opening and conducting elections
of State, county or township officers, and designating the places of
voting: * * Sgc. 27 * *; and
laws shall be passed, regulating
elections, and prohibiting, under
adequate penalties, all undue influence thereon, from power, bribery,
tumult, or other improper. practice." At 'the general election of
i88o, the Eighteenth Article was
ratified as follows: " ScTrON r.
The rights of suffrage and officeholding shall not be withheld from
ajpy male citizen of the United
States by reason of his color or previous condition of servitude."
[In Claylon v. Harris(1871), 7
Nev. 64, the votes of electors
whose names were on the registry
list, but who had not taken the
oath required by the Act of 1869,
were held rightly received as the
additional oath required by that
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Act impeded or trammeled the
right of suffrage by adding new
qualifications. Daviesv. .fffcIeeby
(1870), 5 Id. 369, to the same effect.
[The New fampshire Bill of
Rights forms Part First of the State
Constitution, and provides-"ART.
ii. All elections ought to be free;
and every inhabitant of the State,
having the proper qualifications,
has equal right to elect and be
elected into office." The Second
Part of this Constitution contains
the following provisions in relation
to suffrage: "ART. x3. All persons qualified to vote in the election of Senators, shall be entitled
to vote, within the district where
they dwell, in the choice of representatives. ART. 28. The Senate
shall be the first branch of the
legislature, and the senators shall
be chosen in the following manner,
*viz. : every male inhabitant of each
town, and parish with town privileges, and places unincorporated,
in this State, of twenty-one years
of age and upward, excepting paupers and persons excused from
paying taxes at their own request,
shall have the right, at the biennial
or other meetings of the inhabitants of said towns and parishes, to
be duly warned and holden biennially forever, in the month of
November, to vote, in the town or
parish wherein he dwells, for the
senator in the district whereof he
is a member. ART. 3o . And every
person qualified as the Constitution
provides, shall be considered an
inhabitant, for the purpose of
electing and being elected into any
office or place within this State, in
the town, parish and plantation
where he dwelleth and hath his
home. ART. 31. And the inhabitants of plantations and places unincorporated, qualified as this Con-
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stitution provides, who are or shall
be required to assess taxes upon
themselves toward the support of
government, or shall be taxed
therefor, shall have the same privilege of voting for senators, in the
plantations and places wherein
they reside, as the inhabitants of
the respective towns and parishes
aforesaid have.
*
*
ART. 42.
The governor shall be chosen biennially, in the month of Novemher, and the votes for governor shall
be received, sorted, counted, certified, and returned in the same manner as the votes for Senators; * *
ART. 6o. There shall be biennially
elected by ballot, five councilors,
for advising the governor in the
executive part of government. The
freeholders and other inhabitants
in each county, qualified to vote
for Senators, shall, some time in
the month of November, give in#
their votes for one councilor, which
votes shall be received, sorted,
counted, certified, and returned to
the Secretary's office, in the same
manner as the votes of Senators,
to be by the Secretary laid before
the Senate and House of Representatives on the first Wednesday
of June."
[In Davis v. School Districl of
Haverhill(1862), 44 N. H. 398, the
Court said, "Where the Constitution has established a political
right or privilege, but has not particularly designated the manner of
its exercise, it is within the constitutional limits of the legislative
power to adopt all necessary regulations in regard to the time and
mode of exercising it, which are
reasonable and uniform, and designed to secure and facilitate the
exercise of such right in-a prompt,
orderly and convenient manner.
Such a construction would afford

no warrant for such an excrcise of
legislative power as under the pretense of regularity should subvert
or injuriously restrain the right
itself, but a statute merely providing a mode of exercising the right,
easy and reasonable, and calculated
to prevent error and fraud, and secure order, regularity and uniformity in the conduct of elections,
and thereby give more security to
the right itself, is not open to this
objection. It is hardly practicable
in establishing the fundamental
law of the State to fix precise regulations for its application, so minutely and accurately that they
shall suffice for any case that may
arise, and therefore the framers of
our Constitution only settled the
general principles that should govern the right of suffrage, without
attempting to enact in detail rules
to regulate or secure its exercise,
and that instrument has fixed the
qualifications of voters, but has not
provided what shall be the evidence
of such qualifications, or how or
when it shall be furnished. The
great object of these provisions of
the Constitution is to extend to
every citizen of proper age, with
the exceptions specified, the right
of suffrage, so that each may have
his equal voice and proportionate
weight at the polls. "* * In construing the Constitution, where a
strict adherence to its letter would
manifestly conflict with its spirit
and intent, and would defeat its
object, the object and purpose of
the-instrument are to be regarded
more than the letter. * * Unles
some uniform rules as to the evidence.of residence are established
by the legislature, numerous questions, not always free from doubt
and difficulty, are left to be determined, as they may arise, * * *
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and in such case the full, fair and
effectual exercise of the constitutional right of suffrage might often
be endangered from the want of
certainty and uniformity in the
rules of evidence and decision. *
* Under the acts in question no
citizen entitled to vote will ordinarily be deprived of the exercise
of his right, except by his own voluntary act, and the acts themselves
are mere regulations as to the evidence that the citizen dwells and
has his home in a particular town,
and their objectis not to subvert or
injuriously limit or restrain the
right of snifrage, but to secure it in
its full extent to those entitled to it
by preventing fraudulent voting."
[The Second Article of the Constitution of New Jersey regulates
the right of suffrage thus-" I. Every male citizen of the United
States, of the age of twenty-one
years, who shall have been a resident of this State one year, and of
the county in which he claims to
vote five months, next before the
election, shall be entitled to vote
for all officers that now are or hereafter may be elective by the people; Provided, that no person in
the military, naval or marine service of the United States shall be
considered a resident of thig State,
by being stationed in any garrison,
barrack, or military or naval place
or station within this State; and
no pauper, idiot, insane person, or
person convicted of a crime which
now excludes him from being a
witness, unless pardoned or. restored by law to the right of suffrage, shall enjoy the right of an
elector; andprovidedfurther,that
in time of war, no elector in the
actual military service of the
State, or of the United States, in
the army or navy thereof, shall be

deprived of his vote by reason of
his absence from such election district; and the legislature shall
have power to provide the manner
in which, and the time and place
at which, such absent electors may
vote, and for the return and canvass of their votes in the election
districts in which they respectively
reside. 2. The legislature may
pass laws to deprive persons of the
right of suffrage, who shall be convicted of bribery."
[The Territory of New Jlfezico
has no special provisions to distinguish it from Arizona, suefra, page
872.
[The Constitution of Vew York
begins its First Article by an unusual form of words-" Sgcrox i.
No member of this State shall be
disfranchised, or deprived of any
of the rights or privileges secured
to any citizen thereof, unless by
the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers." The qualifications of electors are contained in
the Second Article, embracing this
extraordinary lax provision-"SEcTIoN i. Every male citizen of the
age of twenty-one years, who shall
have been a citizen for ten days
and an inhabitant of this State one
year next preceding an election,
and for the last' four months a resident of the county, and for the last
thirty days a resident of the election district in which he may offer
his vote, shall be entitled to vote at
such election in the election district of which he shall at the time
be a resident, and not elsewhere,
for all officers that now are or hereafter may be elective by the people,
and upon all questions which may
be submitted to the vote of the
people; provided that in time of
war, no elector in the actual military service of the State, or of the
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United States, in the arny or navy
thereof, shall be deprived of his
vote by reason of his absence from
such election district; and the legislature shall have power to provide
the manner in which, and the time
and place at which, such absent
electors may vote, and for the return and canvass of their votes in
the election districts in which they
respectively reside.
SEC. 2. No
person who shall receive, expect or
offer to receive, or pay, offer or
promise to pay, contribute, offer or
promise to contribute to another,
to be paid or used, any money or
other valuable thing as a compensation or reward for the giving or
withholding a vote at an election,
or who shall make any promise to
influence the giving or withholding
any such vote, or who shall make
or become directly or indirectly
interested in any bet or wager depending upon the result of any
election, shall vote at such election; and upon challenge for such
cause, [&c.] * * The legislature,
at the session thereof next after the
adoption of this section [which
went into effect, January 1, I875,]
shall, and from time to time thereafter may, enact laws excluding
from the right of suffrage all persons convicted of bribery or of any
infamous crime. SEC. 3. For the
purpose of voting, no person shall
be deemed to have gained or lost a
residence, by reason of,his presence or absence, while employed
in the service of the United States;
nor while engaged in the navigation of the waters of this State, or
of the United States, or of the high
seas; nor while a student of any
seminary of learning; nor while
kept at any alms-house, or other
asylum, at public expense; nor
while confined in any public prison.

SEC. 4. Laws shall be made for
ascertaining by proper proofs, the
citizens who shall be entitled to
the right of suffrage hereby established." By the eighteenth section
of the Third Article, "the legislature shall not pass a private or
local bill" for "The opening and
conducting of elections or designating places of voting."
[In The People ex rel. Frost et
al. V. Wilso (1875), 62 N. Y. i86,
the Court held that the sixth section of the registry act of 1872 was
only to be construed to prohibit
the inspectors from receiving the
votes of persons not registered prior
to the election saying "The prohibition was designed to prevent unregistered voters from taking part
in the election, and to compel registration to be made before the day
of election, and not to make the
right to vote 6fpersons whose names
are on the list prior to the election
to depend upon the fact of the inspectors having observed all the
minute directions of the act in preparing the register."
LThe Constitution of North Carolina declares in its First Article,
among its special enumeration of
rights, that-" SEC. io. All elections ought to be free. SEC. 22.
As political rights and privileges
are not dependent upon, or modified by property, therefore no
property qualifications ought to
,affect the right to vote or hold
office." The Sixth Article treats of
suffrage in these sections-" SEc.
i. Every male person born in the
United States, and every male person who has been naturalized,
twenty-one years old or upward,
who shall have resided in the State
twelve months next preceding the
election, and ninety days in the
county in which he offers to vote,
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shall be deemed an elector. But
no person, who, upon conviction
or confession in open Court, shall
be adjudged guilty of felony, or
any other crime, infamous by the
laws of this State, and hereafter
committed, shall be deemed an
elector, unless such person shall be
restored to the rights of citizenship
in a manner prescribed by law.
SEC. 2. It shall be the duty of the
General Assembly to provide, from
time to time, for the registration
of all electors; and no person shall
be allowed to vote without registration, or to register, without first
taking an oath or affirmation to
support and maintain the Constitution and laws of the United States,
and the Constitution and laws of
North Carolina not inconsistent
therewith."
[In 17lcDowell v. Rutherford Ry.
Construction Co. et als. (1887), 96
N. C. 514, in passing upon the provision in the Constitution (Article
VI, sections one and two) regarding registration of voters, the
Court says: "An essential requisite
of a qualified elector-voter--is,
that he shall be registered as such.
* * The obvious purpose of this
provision [Article VI, sections one
and two] is to ascertain who are
entitled to vote, and to facilitate
the exercise of the elective franchise by citizens so entitled, and to
prevent unlawful voting, fraud and
confusion in all elections by the
people. A lawful registered elector, and only he, is a qualified
voter in the sense of the Constitu-.
tion ; and, also in the sense of all
statutes, nothing to the contrary
appearing. Who were the qualified voters at a particular election,
were those and only those, who
were then lawfully registered. *
* We may add in this connection,

that while the registration of electors is thus essential and very important, opportunity must be offered to all persons eligible to become qualified voters, to register
as such, next before each election,
as prescribed by law. The law encourages electors to vote, and it
provides and intends that each person eligible shall have opportunity'
to qualify himself to that end, before an approaching election. And
if such opportunity shall be withheld or denied, on.purpose, by accident, or by inadvertence, such
denial would vitiate and render
void the election, certainly if such
denial should materially affect the
result. To the same effect, Perry
v. Whitaker (1874), 71 Id. 475;
Van Bokkelan v. Canaday (1875),
73 Id. 198; Smith et al.v. The City
of Wilminglon et al.(1887), 98 Id.
343.
[The Constitution of North Dakota, adopted in 1889 on the admission of the State, regulates the
Elective Franchise in Article V so
that-" SEc. 121. Every male person of the age of twenty-one years
or upwards, belonging to either of
the following classes, who shall
have resided in the State one year,
in the county six months, and1 in the
precinct ninety days next preceding any election, shall be deemed a
qualified elector at such election:
First. Citizens of the United
States. Second. Persons of foreign
birth who shall have declared their
intention to become citizens, one
year and not more than six years
prior to such election, conformably
to the naturalization laws of the
United States. Third. Civilized
persons of Indian descent who shall
have severed their tribal relations
two years next preceding such-election. SEc. 125. No elector shall
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be deemed to have lost his residence in this State by reason of his
absence on business of the United
States, or of this State, or in the
military or naval service of the
United States. Sec. 126. No soldier, sailor, seaman or marine in
the army or navy of the United
States, shall be deemed a resident
of this State in consequence of his
being stationed therein. S14C. 127.
No person who is under guardianship, zoit compos mentis or insane,
shall be qualified to vote at any
election, nor shall any person convicted of treason or felony, unless
restored to civil rights."
[The Constitution of Ohio, in its
Fifth Article, declares that-" SEuTioN i. Everywhite male citizen
of the United States, of the age of
-twenty-one years, who shall have
been a resident of the State one
year next preceding the election, and of the county, township,
or ward in which he resides, such
time as may be provided by law,
shall have the qualifications of an
elector and be entitled to vote at
all elections. SEc. 4. The general
assembly shall have power to exclude from the privileges of voting,
or of being eligible to office, any
person convicted of bribery, perjury, or other infamous crime.
SEc. 5. No person in the military,
naval, or marine service of the
United States, shall, by being stationed in any garrison, or military
or naval station, within th6 State,
be considered a resident of this
State. SEc. 6. No idiot or insane
jperson shall be entitled to the
privileges of an elector."
[In .17onroev. Collins (1867), 17
Ohio St. 665, it is said, "What the
legislature cannot do directly, it
cannot do by indirection.- If it has
mo power expressly tb deny or take

away the right, it has none to define it away or unreasonably to
abridge or impede its enjoyment by
laws professing to be merely remedial. The power of the legislature
in such cases is limited to laws
regulating'the enjoyment of the
right, by facilitating its lawful exercise and preventing its abuse.
All reasonable latitude should be
allowed the legislature in the exercise of this power of regulation,
and every reasonable intendment
in favor of the constitutionality of
laws enacted for that purpose,
should be made by the courts.
Such laws are not to be held unconstitutional unless clearly so,
and if they will at all bear a construction which makes them consistent with the Constitution, they
are to receive that construction,
and so to be upheld. The true line
between laws which take away or
abridge the right of suffrage, and
those which may lawfully be enacted to regulate its exercise, is
laid down by the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, in Capen v. Foster
[sup ra] *
* that laws of the
latter description must be reasonable, uniforin and imifpartial, and
mu'st be calculated tofacilitateand
secure rather than to subvert or
impede the exercise of the right to
vote." This ruling of the Court is
substantially followed and approved of in The State e.r rel. v.
Constantine(I884), 42 Ohio St. 437.
In the subsequent case of Daggelt
v. Hudson (1885), 43 Id. 548, the
Court passed upon the validity of
the Act of May 4, 1885, requiring
the registration of voters in Cincinnati and Cleveland, in all cases as
a condition to the right of suffrage,
and only allowing seven days in
the year in which to register and
correct the registration, and mak-
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ing no provision for subsequent
registration, or whereby those constitutionally qualified might vote
upon proof Qf such qualification,
upon showing good reason for not
having registered in time. The
Court in holding the Act unconstitutional, rely upon the cases of
Capen v. Foster and Monroe v.
Collins, supra, and say, "We have
been unable to find any case where
a registration act has been upheld
as constitutional which contained
provisions similar to our statute."
[The Second Article of the
Constitution of Oregon declares,
that-" SEcixO x. All elections
shall be free and equal. SEC. 2. In
all elections not otherwise provided for by this Constitution, every white male citizen of the
United States, of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, who
shall have resided in the State during the six months immediately
preceding such election, and every
white male of foreign birth of the
age of twenty-one years and upwards, who shall have resided in
this State during the six months
immediately preceding such election, and shall have declared his
intention to become a citizen of
the United States one year preceding such election, conformably to
the laws of the United States on the
subject of naturalization, shall be
entitled to vote at all elections authorized by law. SEc. 3. No idiot
or insane person shall be entitled to
the privileges of an elector; and
the privilege of an elector shall be
forfeited, by a conviction of any
crime which is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary.
SEc. 4. For the purpose of voting,
no person shall be deemed to have
gained or lost a residence by reason of his presence or absence

while employed in the service of
the United States, or of this State;
nor while engaged in the navigation of the waters of this State, or
of the United States, or of the high
seas; nor while a student of any
seminary of learning; nor while
kept at any alms-house, or other
asylum, at public expense; nor
while confined in prison. SEc. 5.
No soldier, seaman, or marine, in
the army or navy of the United
States, or of their allies, shall be
deemed to have acquired a residence in the State in consequence
of having been stationed within the
same ;. nor shall any such soldier,
seaman, or marine have the right
to vote. SEc. 6. No negro, Chinaman, or mulatto shall have the
right of suffrage. SEc. 8. The
legislative assembly shall enact
laws to support the privilege of
free suffrage, prescribing the manner of regulating And conducting
elections, and prohibiting, under
adequate penalties, all undue influence therein from power, bribery,
tumult, and other improper conduct. SEC. 15. * *; and in all
elections by the people, votes shall
be given openly or viva voce, until
the legislative assembly shall otherwise direct. SEC. 17. All qualified voters shall vote in the election
precinct in the county where they
may reside, for county officers, and
in any cbunty in the State for State
officers, or in any county of a congressional district in which such
electors may reside for members
of Congress."
By the Twentythird Section of the Fourth Article,
"The legislative assembly shall not
pass special or local laws, * *
Providing for opening and conducting the elections of State, county,
or township officers, and designating the places of voting."
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[In White v. Commissioners of

A ulntomak. County (1886), 13 Or.
317, the question as to the constitutionality of the registry act was
raised, the Court declaring such act
ifiso facto void, WAIDO, C. J., saying, "The right to vote under the
Constitution is a vested constitutional right. ' When I say a right
is vested, I mean that he has the
power to do certain actions, or to
possess certain things, according to
the law of the land.' If the right
be vested by the Constitution, it
denotes a right that cannot under
the Constitution, be taken away.
It would seem that every case, from
Capea v. Foster [supra,] down,
which has sustained against similar
objections the constitutionality of a
registry law which requires previous registry as a prerequisite to the
right to vote, has taken it for
granted that such laws were mere
rules of procedure. * * When
the right is secured by the Constitution, such laws, having merely a
legislative sanction are void. * *
Under this Act, he who goes to the
polls on election day possessing
every constitutional qualification,
may find that the legislature has
stepped in between him and the
Constitution.
He finds his vote
denied because he has not done
something which the legislature
has required him to do. He discovers that he is not a qualified
elector, and yet he is told that his
omission to do the act which had
effect to disqualify him, is not
itself a disqualification; or if he
have performed the act, that his
performance does not constitute a
qualification. This will not square
with the logic of facts. This distinction between what is substantive and what is modal is confounded. He who has a right to
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something to-morrow can never be
secure of his right until to-morrow
comes. If this can result, then the
Constitution does not mean what it
says." This opinion was concurred
in by LORD, J., and dissented from

by

THAy R, J.

The Constitution of Pennsylvavia, proclaimed January 7, 1874,
differed from the Constitution of
1838 in the omission of the following bracketted words and the insertion of those in italics: ARTIcr.
[III.], VIII. [Of] Sytffrage and
SEcTION' I. [In elecElecCtions.
tions by the citizens,] Every [white
freeman] male citizen [of the age
of] twenty-one years of age, possessing the following qualificalions, shall be entitled to vote at all
elections: First.-He shall have
been a citizen of the United States
at least one nonth. Second.-He
shall have [having] resided in [the]
this State one year (or if, having
previously been a qualified elector
or native born citizen ofthe State,
he shall have removed therefrom
and returned, then six vonths),
immediatelypreceding the election.
Third.-He shall have resided in
the election district where he [offers] shall offer to vote [ten days]
at least two months immediately
preceding the election. Fourth.If twenty-two years of age or uzpwards, he shall have paid [and]
within two years [paid] a State or
county tax, which shall have been
assessed at least [ten days] two
months andpaid at least one month
before the election [shall enjoy the
rights of an elector. But a citizen
of the United States, who had previously been a qualified voter of
this State, and removed therefrom
and returned, and who shall have
resided in thc election district and
paid taxes as aforesaid, shall be en-
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titled to vote after residing in the
State six months: Provided, that
white freemen, citizens of the
United States, between the ages of
twenty-one and tventy-two years,
and having resided in the State one
year and in the election district
ten days as aforesaid, shall be entitled to vote, although they shall
not have paid taxes]."
[The same Article continues"Sc. 4. All eletions by the citizens shall be by ballot. Fvery ballot voted shall be numbered in the
order in which it shall be received,
and the number recorded by the
election officers on the list of
voters, opposite the name of the
elector who presents the ballot.
Any elector may write his name
upon his ticket or cause the same
to be written thereon and attested
by a citizen of the district. The
election officers shall be sworn or
affirmed not to disclose how any
elector shall have voted unless required to do so as witnesses in a
judicial proceeding. SEc. 6. Whenever any of the qualified electors
of this Commonwealth shall be in
actual military service, under a
requisition from the President of
the United States or by the authority of this Commonwealth, such
electors may exercise the right of
suffiage in all elections by the citizens, under such regulations as are
or shall be prescribed by law, as
fully as if they were present at
their usual places of election. Sxc.
7. All laws regulating the holding
of elections by the citizens or for
the registration of electors shall be
uniform throughout the State, but
no elector shall be deprived of the
privilege of voting by reason of his
naxhe not being registered. SEc. 8.
Any person who shall give, or
promise or offer to give, to an elec-

tor, any money, reward or other
valuable consideration for his vote
at an election, or for withholding
the same, or who shall give or
promise to give such consideration
to any other person or party for
such elector's vote or for the withholding thereof, and any elector
who shall receive or agree to receive, for himself or for another,
any money, reward or other valuable consideration for his vote at
an election, or for withholding the
same, shall thereby forfeit the right
to vote at such election, and any
elector whose right to vote shall be
challenged for such cause before
the election officers, shall be required to swear or affirm that the
matter of the challenge is untrue
before his vote shall be received.
SEc. 9. : "; andanypersonconvicted of wilful violation of the
election laws shall, in addition to
any penalties provided by law, be
deprived of the right of suffrage
absolutely for the term of four
years. SEC. 13. For the purpose
of voting no person shall be deemed
to have gained a residence by reason of his presence, or lost it by
reason of his absence, while employed in the service, either civil
or military, of this State, or of the
United States, nor while engaged
in the navigation of the waters of
the State or of the United States,
or on the high seas, nor while a
student of any institution of learning, nor while kept in any poorhouse or other asylum at public
expense, nor while confined in
public prison."
[Under the Constitution of 1838,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held a registry law to be invalid, because no Constitutional
qualification of a voter could be
abridged, added to or altered by
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the Legislature. "These are the
Constitutional qualifications necessary to be an elector. They are
defined, fixed and enumerated in
that Instrument. In those who
possess them, is vested a high, and,
to a7 freeman, sacred right, of
which they cannot be divested by
any but the power which established them, viz., the people in
their direct legislative capacity.
This will not be disputed. For the
orderly exercise of the right resulting from these qualifications, it is
admitted that the legislature must
prescribe necessary regulations as
to the place, mode and manner,
and whatever else may be required
to insure its full and free exercise.
But this duty and right inherently
imply, that such regulations are to
be subordinate to the enjoyment of
the right, the exercise of which is
regulated. The right must not be
impaired by the regulation. It
must be regulation purely, not destruction. If this were not an immutable principle, elements essential to the right itself might be invaded, frittered away or entirely
exscinded, under the name or pretense of regulation, and thus would
the natural order of things be subverted by making the principle
subordinate to the accessory. To
state is to prove this position. As
a corollary of this, no Constitutional qualification of an elector
can in the least be abridged, added
to, or altered, by legislation or the
pretense of legislation. Any such
action would be necessarily absolutely void and of no effect."
THomPSoN, C. J., Page v. Allen
(x868), 58 Pa. 346-7. Consequently unusual and burdensome provisions with regard to registering
were deemed to render the law invalid; especially that part of it re-
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quiring registration ten days before the day of election, but only
upon proof of a ten days' residence
within the precinct, thus virtually
requiring twenty days' residence
when only ten was required by the
Constitution.
[After the decision in Page v.
411en, sup ra, a registry law for the
City of Philadelphia, approved
April 17, 1869, was upheld in Patterson v. Barlow, (1869), 6o Pa. 54,
though "differing in important
particulars from those of otler
parts of the State. In that City an
unregistered person could not vote.
The inequalities in that Act, the
great difficulty for many persons to
procure registration under its provisions for Philadelphia, and if unregistered, the consequent deprivation of their votes, created much
discussion respecting its constitutionality" : TRUNKEY, J., IIz re
Election of lcDonough (1884), 105
Pa. 488, 492. The question of uniformity of registry was conclusively settled in the negative in Convention of 1837-8 of a provision for
uniformity: AGN-iiw, J., Pallerson
v. Barlow (1869), 6o Pa. 54, -77;
and so remained until the Convention of 1873 inserted in the Article
VIII of the present Constitution of
Pennsylvania-" SIc. 7. All laws
regulating the holding of elections
by the citizens, or for the registration of electors, shall be uniform
throughout the State, but no elector shall be deprived of the privilege
of voting by reason of his name
not being registered." It should
be observed that both the Constitution of 1838 and that of 1874, provide in the Bill of Rights, "Sec.
5. [That all] elections shall be
free and equal, * :
[Subsequently the Court declared
that" it was the imperative duty of
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an elector whose name is not on
the list of registered voters, to produce the required affidavits at the
time he offers to vote, and that the
election officers have no power to
waive the production of the essential proofs. * " The Constitution contemplates that the electors
shall be ascertained previous to the
receiving of their votes, not that
all men, qualified and unqualified,
may cast their ballots, and the legal
be separated from the illegal, after
the election:" TRUNicV, J., In re
Election of AicDonough (1884), Io
Pa. 488, 495.
[By the Third Article of the Constitution of Pennsylvania-"I SEC. 7.
The General Assembly shall not
pass any local or special law * *
for the opening and conducting of
elections, or fixing or changing the
place of voting; * *"'
In Rhode Island, a registry law
was upheld, although no proof
could be made on the day of election, so as to entitle the elector to
vote. The law, however, allowed
him to apply for registration, up to
within a few days of the day of election; and especial emphasis was
laid upon this fact: In re The Polling Lists (Y88I), 13 R. I. 729;
Ward v. joslin decided Dec. Io,
1889, by the Supreme Court of this
State.
[The first of these citations was an opinion, at the request
of the Legislature, based upon the
following Sections of Article Second of the Constitution of 1842"SEcTION I.

Every male citizen

of the United States of the age of
twenty-one years, who has had his
residence and home in this State
for one year, and in the town or
city, in which he may claim a right
to vote, six months, next preceding the time of voting, and .vho is
really and truly possessed in his

own right of real estate in suck
town or city of the value of one
hundred and thirty four dollars,
over and above all incumbrances,
or.which shall rent for seven dollars per annum pver and above any
rent reserved or the interest of any
incumbrances thereon, being an
estate in fee simple, fee tail, for
the life of any person, or an estate
in reversion or remainder, which
qualifies no other person to vote,
the conveyance of which estate, if
by deed, shall have been recorded
at least ninety days; shall thereafter have right to vote in thc election of all civil officers and on all
questions in all legal town or ward
meetings so long as he continues
so qualified. And if any person
hereinbefore described shall own
any such estate within this State
out of the town or city in which he
resides, he shall have a right to
vote in the election of all general
officers and members of the general
assembly in the town or city in
which he shall have had his residence and home for the term of six
months next preceding the election, upon producing a certificate
from the clerk of the town or city
in which his estate lies, bearing
date within ten days of the time of
his voting, setting forth that such
person has a sufficient eltate
therein to qualify him as a voter;
and that the deed, if any, has been
recorded ninety days." [This Section was amended in 1864, by providing for voting by soldiers and
sailors in the service of the United
States.]
"SEc. 6. The general assembly
shall have full power to provide for
a registry of voters, to prescribe the
manner of conducting the elections,
the form of certificates, the nature
of the evidence to be required in
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case of a dispute as to the right of
any person to vote, and generally
to enact all laws necessary to carry
this article into effect, and to prevent abuse, corruption, and fraud in
voting."
[The Second Section of the same
article has been amended by Chapter 672 of the Laws of 1888, by adding to the Amendments, Article
VII-the words inserted being in
italics and those omitted (except
the temporary clause) being bracketted-" SEcT oN x. Every male
[native] citizen of the United
States, of the age of twenty-one
years, who has had [the residence
herein required-i. e.,] his residence and home in this State for
two years, and in the town or city
in which he may offer to vote, six
months next preceding the time of
his voting, andwhose name shall be
registered in the town or city where
he resides, on or before the last day
of December in the year next preceding the time of his voting, [and
who shall show by legal proof that
he has for and within the year next
preceding the time he shall offer to
vote, paid a tax or taxes assessed
against him in any town or city in
this State to the amount of one dollar, or that he has been enrolled in
a military company in this State,
been equipped and done duty
therein, according to law, and at
least for one day during such year,]
shall have a right to vote in the
election of all civil officers and on
all questions in all legally organized town or ward meetings: Provided, That no person shall at any
time be allowed to vote in the election of the city council of [the city
of Providence] any city, or upon
any proposition to impose a tax, or
for the expenditure of money in
any town or city, unless he shall,

within the year next preceding,
have paid a tax assessed upon his
property therein, valued at least at
one hundred and thirty four dollars."
[In Soutlh Carolina, the Court
held in State ex rel. Stock el als. v.
Schnierle (1852), 5 Rich. (S. C.)
that a registration made on a Sunday was valid and in time. In this
State, the First Article of the Constitution is a Declaration of Rights,
containing-"S=CT loN 3I. All elections shall be free and open, and
every inhabitant of this Commonwealth, possessing the qualifications provided for in this Constitution, shall have an equal right to
elect officers and be elected to fill
SECvIox 33. The
public office.
right of suffrage shall be protected
by laws regulating elections, and
prohibiting under adequate penalties, all undue influences fron
power, bribery, tumult or improper
conduct. SECTIo1r 34. Representation shall be apportioned according to population, and no person
in this State shall be disfranchised
or deprived of any of the rights or
privileges now enjoyed, except by
the law of the land or the judgment of his peers." The Eighth
Article treats of the Rights of Suffrage-" SECTION 2. E very male
citizen of the United States, of the
age of twenty-one years and
upwards, not laboring under the
disabilities named in this Constitution, without distinction of race,
color, or former condition, who
shall be a resident of this State
at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution, or who shall
thereafter reside in this State one
year, and in the County in which
he offers to vote, sixty days next
preceding any election, shall be
entitled to vote for all officers that
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are now or hereafter may be elected
by the people, and upon all questions submitted to the electors at
any elections: Provided, That no
person shall be allowed to vote or
hold office, who is now or hereafter
may be disqualified therefor by the
Constitution of the United States,
until such disqualification shall be
removed by the Congress of the
United States: Provmded further,
That no person, while kept in
alms-house, or asylum, or of unsound mind, or confined in any
public prison, shall be allowed to
vote or hold office. SECTION 3.
It shall be the duty of the General
Assembly to provide from time to
time for the registration of all
electors. SECTION 4. For the purpose of voting, no person shall be
deemed to have lost his residence
by reason of absence while employed in the service of the United
States, nor while engaged upon the
waters of this State or the United
States, or of the high seas, nor
while temporarily absent from the
State.
SECTION 5.
No soldier,
seaman, or marine in the army or
navy of the United States shall be
deemed a resident of this State in
consequence of having been stationed therein. SEcTrIoN 8. The
General Assembly shall never pass
a law that will deprive any of the
citizens of this State of the right
of suffrage, except for treason,
murder, robbery, or dueling,whereof the person shall have been duly
tried and convicted. SECTIoN 12.
No person shall be disfranchised
for felony or other crimes committed while such person was a
slave."
[The Constitution of South Dakola, adopted on the admission of
the State, provides in the Bill of
Rights contained in its Sixth Arti-

cle,

that-"SEc.

19.

Elections

shall be free and equal, and no
power, civil or military, shall at
any time interfere to prevent the
free exercise of the right of suffrage. Soldiers in time of war may
vote at their post of duty, in or out
of the State, under regulations to
be prescribed by the legislature."
And in the Seventh Article, on
Elections and Rights of Suffrage,' SECTION I.

Every male person

[a] resident of this State, who shall
be of the age of twenty-one years
and upwards, not otherwise disqualified, belonging to either of
the following classes, who shall be
a qualified elector under the laws
of the Territory of Dakota, at the
date of the ratification of this Constitution by the people, or who
shall have resided in the United
States one year, in the State six
months, in the county thirty days,
and in the election precinct where
he offers to vote, ten days next preceding any election, shall be
deemed a qualified elector at such
election: First: Citizens of the
United States. Second: Persons of
foreign birth who shall have dedared their intention to become
citizens,, conformably to the laws
of the United States upon the subject of naturalization."
Sections
6, 7 and 8 are literally the same as
Sections 125, 126 and 127 of the
Constitution of Norll Dakota, sitpira.

[The Declaration of Rights in
the First Article of the Constitution of Tennessee declares-" SZcTION5.

That elections shallbe free

and equal,and the rightofsuffrage,as
hereinafter declared, shall never be
denied to any person entitled thereto, except upon a conviction by a
jury, of some infamous crime previously ascertained and declared by
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law, and judgment thereon by court
of competent jurisdiction." The
Right of Suffrage is defined in the
Fourth Article-" S CTIOx I. Rvcry male person of the age of twenty-one years, being a citizen of the
United States, and a resident of this
State for twelve months, and of the
county wherein he may offer his
vote for six months next preceding the day of election, shall be entitled to vote for members of the
General Assembly, and other civil
officers for the county or district in
which he resides; and there shall
be no qualification attached to the
right ot suffrage, except that each
voter shall give to the judges of
election, when he offers to vote,
satisfactory evidence that he has
paid the poll taxes assessed against
him for such preceding period as
the Legislature shall prescribe, and
at such times as may be prescribed
by law, without which his vote
cannot be received. And all male
citizens of the State shall be subject
to the payment of pol1 taxes and
the performance of military duty
within such ages as may be prescribed by law. The General Assembly shall have power to enact
laws requiring voters to vote in the
election precincts in which they
may reside, and laws to secure the
freedom of elections and the purity
of the ballot-box. SEc. 2. Laws
may be passed, excluding from the
right of suffrage, persons who may
be convicted of infamous crimes."
[In Ridley v. Sherbrook (i866),
3 Cold. (Tenn.) 569, where the register had refused to enter on the
register, the name of the complainant, who had been convicted of
certain offences, but had received a
full pardon, the Court said, "The
elective franchise is not an inalienable right or privilege, but a politi-

cal right, conferred, limited or
withheld at the pleasure of the
people, acting in their sovereign
capacity. Each State may define
it in its own Constitution, or empower its Legislature to do so.
The right once granted may be
taken away by the exercise of sovereign power or forfeited for crime,
under the laws of the State; and if
taken away by the sovereign power
of the State, (as by an alteration in
the Constitution) no vested right is
violated, or bill of attainder passed,
or act of pains and penalties, in the
sense of the Constitution of the
United States. * * A political
right * * is a political privilege
or grant, that may be extended or
recalled, at the will of the sovereign
power."
The Court held that
though he had a right to vote
under the Constitution of 1834, the
Legislature having changed Article
IV, section one of the Constitution,
he could not claim the right to
register as a voter, unless he
brought himself within the provisions of the act, which was valid
and binding.
[The First Article of the Constitution of Texas contains the Bill of
Rights, including-" SEC. i9. No
citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property,
privileges or immunities, or in any
manner disfranchised, except by
the due course of law of the land."
The Third Article provides-" SEC.
56. The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, pass any local or special law, authorizing:
For
the opening and conducting elections, or fixing or changing the
places of voting; * *"
Suffrage is regulated in the Sixth Article-" SEcuIoN i.-The following
classes of persons shall not be al-
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lowed to vote in this State, to wit:
First-Persons under twenty-one
years of age. Second--Idiots and
lunatics. Third-All paupers supported by any county. FourthAll persons convicted of any felony,
subject to such exceptions as the
Legislature may make. Fifth-All
soldiers, marines and seamen, employed in the service of the army
or nayy of the United States. SEc.
2.-Every male person subject to
none of the foregoing disqualifications, who shall have attained the
age of twenty-one years, and who
shall be a citizen of the United
States, and who shall have resided
in this State one year next preceding an election, and the last six
months within the district or
county in which he offers to vote,
shall be deemed a qualified elector;
and every male person of foreign
birth, subject to none of the foregoing disqualifications, who, at any
time before.an election, shall have
declared his intention to become a
citizen of the United States, in accordance with the federal naturalization laws, and shall have resided
in this State one year next preceding such election, and the last six
months in the county in which he
offers to vote, shall also be deemed
a qualified elector; and all electors
shall vote in the election precinct
of their residence; provided, that
electors living in any unorganized
county, may vote at any election
precinct in the county to which
such county is attached, for judicial
purposes.
SEc. 3.-All qualified
electors of the State, as herein described, who shall have resided for
six months immediately preceding
an election within the limits of any
city dr corporate town, shall have
the right to vote for mayor and all
other elective officers; but in all

elections to determinie expenditure
of money or assumption of debt,
only those shall be qualified to vote
who pay taxes on property in said
city. or incorporated town; provided, that no poll tax for the payment of debts thus incurred shall
be levied upon the persons debarred from voting in relation
thereto. SEC. 4.-In all elections
by the people, the vote shall be by
ballot, and the Legislature shall
provide for the numbering of
tickets, and make such other regulations as may be necessary to detect and punish fraud and preserve
the purity of the ballot-box; but
no law shall ever be enacted, requiring a registration of the voters
of this State." Among the General Provisions in the Sixteenth
Article, are-" SEC. 2.-Laws shall
be made to exclude from office,
serving on juries, and from the
right of suffrage, those who may
have been or shall hereafter be
convicted of bribery, perjury,
forgery, or other high crimes. The
privilege of free suffrage shall be
protected by laws regulating elections, and prohibiting, under adequate penalties, all undue influence
therein from power, bribery, tumult, or other improper practice.
SEC. 4.-Any citizen of this State
who shall, after the adoption of
this Constitution, fight a duel with
deadly weapons, or send or accept
a challenge to fight a duel with
deadly weapons, either within this
State or out of it, or who shall act
as second, or knowingly assist, in
any manner, those thus offending
shall be deprived of the right of
suffrage, or of holding any office
of trust or profit under this State.
SEC. 9.-Absence on business of
the State, or of the United States,
shall not forfeit a residence once
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obtained, so as to deprive anyone
of the right of suffrage, or of being
elected or appointed to any office
under the exceptions contained in
this Constitution."
[The Territory of Utal was made
the subject of the following special
provisions in the Act of March 3,
I8S7 (24 Stat. at Large 639)"SEc. 2o. That it shall not be
lawful for any female to vote at
any election hereafter held in the
Territory of Utah for any .public
purpose whatever, and no such
vote shall be received or counted
or given effect in any manner
whatever; and any and every act
of the legislative assembly of the
Territory of Utah, providing for
or allowing the registration or
voting by females is hereby annulled. SEC. 21. That all laws of
the legislative assembly of the
Territory of Utah, which provide
for numbering or identifying the
votes of the electors at any election
in said Territory, are hereby disapproved and annulled; but the
foregoing provision shall not preclude the lawful registration of
voters, or any other provisions for
securing fair elections, 'which do
not involve the disclosure of the
candidates for whom any particular
elector shall have voted. SEc. 24.
That every male person, twentyone years of age, resident in the
Territory of Utah, shall, as a condition precedent to his right to
register or vote at any election in
said Territory, take and subscribe
an oath or affirmation, before the
registration officer of his voting
precinct, that he is over twenty-one
years of age, and has resided in the
Territory of Utah for six months
then last passed and in the precinct
for one month immediately preceding the date thereof, and that
VOL. XXXVIII-58.

lie is a native born (or naturalized,
as the case may be) citizen of the
United States, and further state in
such oath or affirmation, his full
name, with his age, place of business, his status, whether single or
married, and, if married, the name
of his lawful wife, and that he will
support the Constitution of the
United States, and will faithfully
obey the laws thereof, and especially will obey the act of Congress
approved March twenty-second,
eighteen hundred and eighty-two,
entitled [&c., 22 Stat. at Large 3o,]
"
and will also obey this act in
respect of the crimes in said act
defined and forbidden, and that he
will not, directly or indirectly, aid
or abet, counsel or advise, any
other person to commit any of said
crimes. * * No person shall be
.entitled to vote in any election in
said Territory, or be capable of jury
service, or hold any office of trust
or emolument in said Territory,
whlo shall not have taken the oath
or affirmation aforesaid. No person who shall have been convicted
of any crime under this act, or
under the act of Congress aforesaid,
approved March twenty-second,
eighteen hundred and eighty-two,
or who shall be a polygamist or
who shall associate or cohabit
polygamously with persons of the
other sex, shall be entitled to vote
in any election in said Territory,
or be capable of jury service, or to
hold any office of trust or emoluOtherment in said Territory."
wise, the Territory is under the
same acts, as Arizona,sulpra, page
872.
[The Constitution of Vermont
declares in its First Chapter, that
the rights of the inhabitants include - "ARTICLE 8th. That all
elections ought to be free and with-
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out corruption, and that all freemen
having a sufficient, evident, common interest with, and attachment
to the community, have a right to
elect officers, and to be elected into
office,agreeably to the regulations
made in this Constitution." By
the Plan or Frame of Government
contained in the Second Chapter,itis
ordained that-" SECTION 21st. Every man of the full age oftwenty-one
years, having resided in this State
for the space of one whole year
next before the election of Representatives, and is of a quiet and
peaceable behaviour, and will take
the following oath or affirmation,
shall be entitled to all the privileges of a freeman of this State.
You solemnly'swear (or affirm)
that whenever you give you" vote
or suffrage, touchiog any' matter
that concernis the State of Vermont,
you will do so as in your conscience
you shall judge will mnost conduce
to the best good of the same, as established by the Constitution, without fear or favour of any man.
SEcIo N
34th.
All elections,
whether by' the people or by
the Legislature, shall be free
and voluntary: and any elector who
shall receive any gift or reward for
his vote, in meat, drink, monies
or otherwise, shall forfeit his right
to elect at that time, and suffer such
other penalty as the law shall direct;
The Thirty-ninth Section of
'the same chapter is changed in this
respect by the Amendment "ARTICL
[i.] No person, who
is not already a freeman of this
-State, shall be entitled to exercise
the privileges of a freeman, unless
he be a natural born citizen of this
or some one of the United States,
or until he shall have been
naturalized, agreeably to the acts of
Congress."

[In State ex

rel. Cawley v.

O'Hearn (iSS6), 58 Vt. 718, the
Court said, "The act requiring a
check-list does not say that one
whose name is on it is a legal voter,
but he nmy vote at that election;
nor that every one whose name is
not thereon has no right to have it
there; it says that for the purposes of voting upon that day, it is
conclusive."
Consequently the
Court e amined whether the list
was properly made up, and Hyde v.
Brush, (supra,page 876) was distinguished as deciding merely that the
list could not be questioned on
election day. In neither case was
there an addition to the constitutional qualifications.
[The Constitution of Virginia
-begins with a Bill of Rights comprised in the First Article, and declaring, among other things-" 8.
That all elections ought to be free,
and that all men, having sufficient
evidence of permanent common interests with, andattachment to, the
community, have the right of suffrage, and cannot be taxed or deprived of their property for public
uses, without their own consent, or
that of their representatives so
elected, nor bound by any law to
which they have not in like manner, assented, for the public good."
The Elective Franchise is defined
by the Third Article, thus-" SEc.
i. Every male citizen of the United
States, twenty-one years old, who
shall have been a resident of this
State twelve months, and of the
county, city or town in which he
shall offer to vote three months
next preceding any election, shall
be entitled to vote for members of
the general assembly and all officers elected by the people: provided, that no officer, soldier, seaman,
or marine of the United States
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army or navy, shall *be considered
vote." The other male persons,
a resident of this State by reason
qualified by the election law conof being stationed therein: and tained in Chapter 238 of the Code
provided, also, that the following
of Washington. (ed. i88x) were
persons shall be excluded from vot"SEC. 305 o . All American male
ing: First Idiots and lunatics.
citizens, above the age of twentySecond. Persons convicted of bri- one years, and all American male
bery at any election, embezzlement
half-breeds over that age, who have
of public funds, treason, felony, or
adopted the habits of the whites,
petit larceny. Third. No person
and all other male inhabitants of
who, while a citizen of this State,
this Territory, above that age, who
has, since the adoption of this Conshall have declared, on oath, their
stitution, fought a duel with a intentions to become citizens, at
deadly weapon, sent or accepted a
least six months previous to the
challenge to fight a duel with a day of election, and shall have
deadly weapon, either within or
taken an oath to support the Con.beyond the boundaries of this State,
stitution of the United States, and
or knowingly conveyed a chalthe Organic Act of this Territory,
lenge, or aided or assisted in any
at least six months previous to the
manner in fighting a duel, shall be day of election, and shall have reallowed to vote or hold any office of ,sided six months in the Territory,
honor, profit, or trust under this .and thirty days in the county next
Constitution."
preceding the day of election, and
[The First Article of the Consti- none other, shall be entitled to
tution of Washington, declares,
hold office or vote at any election
among other rights, that-" SEC.
in this Territory: . " ." The
19. All elections shall be free and
same article of the State Constituequal, and no power, civil or mili- tion continues - "SEc.
3. All
tary, shall at any time interfere."
idiots, insane persons and persons
Elections and Elective Rights are convicted of infamous crimes, unregulated in the Sixth Article, thus *less restored to civil rights, are ex-" SEcTION i. All male persons of eluded from the elective franchise.
the age of twenty-one years or over, SEc. 4. For the purpose of voting
possessing the following qualifica- .and eligibility to office, no person
tions, shall be entitled to vote at all
shall be deemed to have gained a
elections: They shall be citizens of residence by reason of his presence,
the United States, 'Provided that or lost it by reason of his absence,
Indians not taxed shall never be -while in the civil or military serallowed the elective franchise: *vice of he State or of the United
provided, furlher, that all male States, nor while a student at any
persons who at the time of the institution of learning, nor while
adoption of this Constitution, are
kept at public expense in any poorqualified electors of the Territory,
house nor other asylum, nor while
shall be electors. They shall have confined in public prison, nor
lived in the State one year, and in
while engaged in the navigation of
the county ninety days and in the the waters of this. State, or of the
city, town, ward or precinct thirty United States, or of the high seas.
lays immediately preceding the SEC. 6. All elections shall be by
election at which they offer to
ballot. The legislature shall pro-
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vide for such method of voting as
will secure to every elector, absolute secrecy in preparing and depositing his ballot. SFc. 7. The
legislature shall enact a registration law, and shall require a compliance with such a law before any
elector shall be allowed tb vote,
provided that this provision is not
compulsory upon the legislature
except as to cities and towns having a population of over five hundred inhabitants.
In all other
cases, the legislature may or may
not require registration as a prerequisite to the right to vote, and
the same system of registration
need not be adopted for both
classes."
[In the Constitution of West
Virginia, the Bill of Rights, in the
Third Article, declares that-" iI.
Political tests, requiring persons,
as a pre-requisite to the enjoyment
of their civil and political rights,
to purge themselves by their own
oaths, of past alleged offences, are
repugnant to the principles of free
government, and are cruel and oppressivd. No religious or political
test oath shall be required as a prerequisite or qualification to vote,
serve as ajuror, sue, plead, appeal,
or pursue any profession or employment. Nor shall any person
be deprived by law, of any right or
privilege, because of any act done
prior to the passage of such law."
The Fourth Article deals with elections thus-" I. The male citizens'
of the State shall be entitled to
vote at all elections held within the
counties in which they respectively
reside: but no person who is a
minor, or of unsound mind, or a
pauper, or who is under conviction
of treason, felony, or bribery in an
election, or who has not been a
resident of the State for one year,

and of the ounty in which he
offers to vote, for sixty days next
preceding such offer, shall be permitted to vote while such disability continues; but no person in the
military, naval or marine service
of the United States shall be
deemed a resident ot this State by
reason of being stationed therein.
2. In all elections by the people,
the mode of voting shall be by ballot; but the voter shall be left free
to vote by either open, sealed, or
secret ballot, as he may elect. ii.
The Legislature shall prescribe the
manner of conducting and making
returns of elections, and of determining contested elections; and
shall pass such laws as may be
necessary and proper to prevent intimidation, disorder or violence at
the polls, and corruption or fraud
in voting, counting the vote, ascertaining or declaring the result, or
fraud in any manner, upon the ballot. 12. No citizen shall ever be
denied or refused the right or privilege of voting at an election, because his name is not, or has not
been registered or listed as a qualified voter. "By the Sixth Article"39. The Legislature shall not
pass local or special laws in any of
the following enumerated cases:
that is to say, for * * The opening or conducting of any election,
or designating the place of voting:
The Wisconsin Constitution contains a clause similar to that of
Iowa, the amendment ratified November 7, 1882, reading-" ART.
III. Sac. i. Every male person,
of the age of twenty-one years or
upwards, belonging to either of the
following classes, who shall have
resided in the State for one year
preceding any election, and in the
election district where he offers to
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vote such time as may be prescribed by the legislature, not exceeding thirty days, shall be
deemed a qualified elector at such
election. i. Citizens of the United
States. 2. Persons of foreign birth
who shall have declared their intentions to become citizens conformably to the laws of the Unittd
States on the subject of naturalization. 3. Persons of Indian blood
who have once been declared by
law of Congress to be citizens of
the United States, any subsequent
law of Congress to the contrary
notwithstanding. 4. Civilized persons of Indian descent, not members of any tribe; fprovided, that
the legislature may at any time,
extend, by law, the right of suffrage
to persons not herein enumerated;
but no such law shall be in force
until the same shall have been submitted to a vote of the people at a
general election, and approved by
a majority of all the votes cast at
such election; and provided friher, that in incorporated cities and
villages, the legislature may provide for the registration of electors,
and prescribe proper rules and regulations."
A registry law was passed in that
State, and held valid, "The Constitution vests every person having
certain qualifications at the time of
any election, with the right of suffrage at such election. Some of
these qualifications rest on time.
which may ripen, or facts which
may accrue, on the very day of
election. So that one may well become vested with the right of franchise pending the election, who
was not so vested before, or perhaps entitled to be registered at
the time of registry. Some entitled to the franchise, may be
sick, or absent, or imprisoned, or

otherwise 'disabled, at the time of
registry.
But the Constitution
vests and warrants the right at the
time of election. And everyone
having the Constitutional qualification then, may go to the polls,
vested with the franchise, of which
no statutory condition precedent
can deprive him.
Statutes
cannot impair the right, though
they may regulate its exercise.
Every statute regulating it, must
be consistent with the Constitutionally qualified voter's right of
suffrage when he claiifis his right
at an election. These statutes may
require proof of the right, consistent with the right itself. And such
we understand to be the theory of
the registry law; ' to guard against
the abuse of the elective franchise,
and to preserve the purity of elections'; not to abridge or impair
the right, but to require reasonable
proof of the right. It was undoubtedly competent for the legislature to provide for a previous
registry of voters, as one mode of
proof of the right; so. that it
should not be a condition precedent
to the right itself at the election,
but, failing the proof of registry,
left other proof open to the voter
at the election, consistent with his
present right. So the legislature
could provide for challengers of
voters at the election, and for the
oath or proof necessary then to assert their right against challenge.
And this we take to be the exact
effect of the registry law as already
construed by this Court.
If a
voter's name is not on the register
at an election, he is in effect challenged by the statute, and required
to furnish prescribed proof of his
right. If there be no register at an
election, the statutory challenge
goes to all the voters; they must
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furnish the requisite proofs of
right. These requirements are not
unreasonable, and are consistent
the present right to vote, as secured by the Constitution. The
statute imposes no condition precedent to the right; it only requires
proof that the right exists. The
voter may assert his right, if he
will, by proof that he has it; may
vote, if he will, by reasbnable compliance with the law. His right is
unimpaired; and if he be disfranchised, it is not by force of the
statute, but by his own voluntary
refusal of proof that he is enfranchised by the Constitution ":
RYAN, C. J. State ex rel Wood v.
Baker (1876), 38 Wis. 71, 86-7.
"But if he were such an agent in
the execution of the registry law as
to be responsible in his right of
suffrage for its nonfeasance or malfeasance ; if he were bound to see
to the putting of his name and residence on the register, or charged
against his right with irregularities or defects of the register, so as
to impair his right of suffrage at the
election, it might be impossible 'to
sustain the registry law under the
Constitution. But we cannot think
that such is a necessary or even an
admissible construction of the statute:" Id. 87.
"And if failure or error in the
duty of the inspectors, of which
voters have no notice in fact, could
operate directly or indirectly to
disfranchise voters at the election,
we should encounter the same difficulty in sustaining the statute
under the Constitution. Nonfeasance or malfeasance of public officers could have no effect to impair a personal, vested, Constitutional right. We -see no such purpose in the registry law. Surely it
would be a strange attempt to pro-

tect the elective franchise and preserve the purity of elections, to put
it in the power of inspectors of
elections, by careless accident or
corrupt design, to disfranchise Constitutional voters. This, we take
it, would be the actual effect of
avoiding elections where the inspectors use defective or irregular
registers at the election, as official
and valid; so entrapping voters
into dispensing with proof of their
right, required and authorized only
when their names are not registered at the election" : Id. 87-8.
Notwithstanding the strong opinions from Wisconsin, quoted above,
the Supreme Court decided that the
registry law of 1879 was invalid.
The act required a previous registration, except in the case of one
becoming qualified between the last
day for registration and the day of
election; and absolutely prohibited
anyone not registered from voting,
except as above stated. "By the
effect of this law," said the Court,
"the elector may, and in many
cases must and will, lose his vote,
by being utterly unable to comply
with this law by reason of absence,
physical disability, or non-age, and
an elector can lose his vote without
his own fault or neglect in this particular.
* * ** The vice is, that
the law disfranchises a constitutionally qualified elector, without
his default or negligence, and
makes no exception in his favor,
and provides no method, chance or
opportunity for him to make proof
of his qualification on the day of
election, the only time, perchance,
when he could possibly do so. The
law undertakes to do what no law
can do, and that is to deprive a person of an absolute right without
his laches, default, negligence or
consent ; and, in order to exercise
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and enjoy it, to require him to accomplish an impossibility": Dells
v. Kennedy (I88o), 40 Wis. 555.
[Associate Justice ORToN, writing
the opinion of the Court, adopted
the language of Chief Justice
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register thirty days before election
day: Kineen v. Wells (1887), 144
Mass. 497; Attorney General v.
City of Detroit (0879), 78 Mich.
545. A similar line of reasoning
to that in this case was pursued in
THOmPSON of Pennsylvania, in
Monroe v. Collins (1867), 17 Ohio
Page v, Allen, supra. A similar. St. 665; Rison v. Farr (1865), 24
view was taken in Ohio, where the
Ark. 161.
elector's right to vote could not be
Where the officers of election failestablished within the five days
ed to make any registry of the elecimmediately preceding the election, and no method was provided
tion; and only seven days in the
for the receiving proof on election
year were allowed for registration:
day of an elector's right to vote, it
Daggettv. Hndson, (I885), 43 Ohio
was held that all ballots cast by
St. 548; and in While v. AInlino- such unregistered electors were
mak Co. (1886), 13 Ore. 317, and
invalid, and could not be counted.
State v. Corner(1887), 22 Neb. 265. People ex rel. Foley v. Kopplekom
It is competent for the Legislature
(1868), 16 Mich.342; Ensworth v.
to prescribe questions to be pro- Albin (870), 46.Mo. 45o; People
pounded to voters, calculated to
ex rel. Elsworthv. Laine (1867),
draw from them proof of their 33 Cal. 55; Vebster v. Byrnes
qualification to vote at an election,
(1867), 34 Id. 273; People ex rel.
and require the voters to answer
Frost v. Wilson (1875), 62 N. Y.
them before they can vote; but
186; State v. Bond (1866), 38 Mo.
this does not prescribe any new
425; State v. Cook (1867), 41 Id.
qualification to the voter: State ex
593; Nefzger v. 0. D. andSt. Pant
r-el. Cothrea v. Lean (1859), 9 Wis. Ry. Co. (1873), 36 Ia. 642; Zeiler
579; State ex rel. Doerflinger v.
v. Chapman (1874), 54 Mo. 502;
Hilmantle (1867), 21 Id. 566.
State v. Sumler Co. (1884), 20 Fla.
[The Constitution of Wyoming is
859; Farenv. Buffalo Co. (1888),
not at hand, and will be mentioned
5 Dak. 36. And where such proofs
in the Legal Notes of a succeeding
could be furnished on election day
number.
butwere not the ballots then cast
Of course, where the constituwere held void; the Courthowever
tion provides for a registry law, no
saying, that if the proofs had been
reasonable question as to its validfurnished, the ballots would have
ity can arise, unless it has the effect
been legal, although there was no
to actually disfranchise electors:
registry whatever: State v. HitHawkins v. Supervisors of Carroll mantle (1867), 21 Wis. 566 ; State v.
Co. (1874), 50 Miss. 735; Hardesly Stumpf (1869), 23 Wis. 630.
v. Taft (1865), 23 Md. 512; AnderIn Illinois it was held that where
son v. Baker (I865), Id. 53r; Auld an unregistered elector voted at an
v. Valton (I57), 12 La. Ann. 129;
election without any proof of right,
but while admitting that a reasonif it does not appear that he was
able registration law is constituchallenged, or any objection made
tional, the Supreme Court of Masto his voting, the presumption
sachusetts held a law invalid which
must be that he was a legal voter,
required all naturalived voters to
so known to the judges of election;

